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Preface
In this dissertation I address issues related to international migration and its
economic impact on the migrants’ sending regions. For the empirical analysis
I use data from household surveys conducted in countries and regions where
the transition to a market economy, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union
and the end of the communist era in Central and Eastern Europe, is associated
with exceptionally large emigration.
The first chapter is based on household survey data from Armenia, Azer-
baijan, and Georgia and provides the first preliminary evidence on the scale of
recent emigration from the South Caucasus and its impact on the economic de-
velopment of the region. The large emigration flows from the South Caucasus
consist primarily of older male labor migrants to Russia. The findings suggest
that current migration from the South Caucasus does not involve mass emigra-
tion of the skilled and the income gains from migration are large, but despite
the higher incomes earned abroad, the migrants’ households do not exhibit
higher propensity to spend on education. The significant correlation between
having a migrant household member and the presence of a family business in
Armenia, however, suggests that the migrants’ earnings and remittances have
the potential to relieve liquidity and risk constraints and contribute to the de-
velopment of the private sector in the South Caucasian economies.
In my second chapter I focus specifically on the effect of international mi-
gration and remittances on the labor supply of the non-migrant household
members. For the empirical analysis I use the Albania 2005 Living Standards
Measurement Survey. The rich dataset allows me to control separately for the
effects of migration and remittances and to deal with the potential endogeneity
problems inherent in this type of analysis by instrumenting for the household
migration decision and remittance receipts. The expected negative impact on
unemployment, due to an income effect of remittances, among the female pop-
ulation in Albania is not confirmed by the data. When an instrumental variable
approach is used, the predicted effects of migration and remittances on labor
supply appear significant only for males between the ages of 46 and 60. Af-
ix
ter instrumenting, for females and for older males I obtain large and positive
coefficients for having a migrant within the family and large and negative co-
efficients for receiving remittances. Although the estimated effects for the fe-
males are insignificant at conventional levels, the magnitudes and signs of all
coefficients suggest that the OLS estimates of the effect of migration are likely
biased downwards, while the OLS estimates of the effect of remittances are
biased upwards, compared to the true effects of these variables.
The third chapter (with Professor Randall K. Filer) draws upon previous
studies on migration from Albania. A large number of studies, based ini-
tially on sporadic surveys of migrants and non-migrants and later based on
large, well-designed household surveys available to the research community,
deal with questions about Albanian migration and its consequences. Those
questions are particularly relevant as Albania’s potential EU membership is
considered. The chapter adds to the literature on migration from former com-
munist economies by being the first survey that compares the findings from
the existing studies on Albanian migration to derive conclusions on the con-
sequences of accession of Albania and other similarly affected countries to the
EU. The study is also a chapter in a larger publication on the effect of post-
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The economic literature has frequently emphasized the significance of migra-
tion research that focuses on the links between labor migration and the eco-
nomic development of migrant-sending regions (Borjas, 1999; Lucas, 2005, for
instance), and a growing number of researchers and policy makers are joining
the debate on the economic consequences of migration. The existing economic
literature has established that the uses of remittances by migrant-sending house-
holds and the human capital lost to migration are likely to have important eco-
nomic implications for the migrant-sending areas.
Central to the debate on the economic impact of migration is the percep-
tion that migrants’ households can channel remittances into productive invest-
ments. Indeed, the most common sources of capital for investment in the de-
veloping economies are owners’ personal savings or informal loans from other
family members (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). The New Economics of Labor
Migration literature (Stark and Bloom, 1985; Taylor, 1999) argues that remit-
tances can relieve the capital constraints faced by households in lower-income
regions. In this way migration can have a positive impact on the development
of the private sector in developing and transition economies. Furthermore, a
number of recent studies find evidence that remittances increase investment
in education in the sending economies through relaxing liquidity constraints
for households with migrants (see, for instance Edwards and Ureta (2003) and
Yang (2008)).
While remittances can provide capital resources and boost the economic ac-
tivity in the migrant-sending regions, the potential loss of human capital due
to emigration is stressed as a detrimental consequence of emigration. The liter-
ature on brain drain often emphasizes that emigration of the highly educated
individuals is costly for the sending country due to lost investments in educa-
tion, productivity and tax revenue.1
The sharp increase in emigration from the CIS countries during the first
years of their independence has been explained mostly by ethnic sorting (Locher,
2002) and, in the case of the three South Caucasian countries, a number of lo-
cal political conflicts and wars that followed the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. It is also likely that the recent emigration experience of Armenia and
Georgia partially follows historical and cultural trends. These two countries
are believed to have had the highest emigration rates in the past, as well as rel-
atively high migrant skill levels among the Former Soviet Union states (Cole-
1A recent strand of this literature, however, argues that emigration of the skilled may also stim-
ulate further investment in human capital in the sending countries through increasing the returns
to education and thus the incentives to invest in schooling. Commander et al. (2003) provide an
extensive survey of the empirical and theoretical literature on brain drain.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
man, 1992). In contrast, emigration from Azerbaijan has been much less intense
in the past.
Unlike earlier migration, in recent years all three South Caucasian coun-
tries have faced similar economic conditions which served as a push factor for
large-scale migration, mainly to neighbouring Russia. Recent evidence sug-
gests that, unlike past migration trends, migration in and out of the CIS has
been increasingly motivated by economic reasons, rather than ethnic sorting
(Rutkowski and Scarpetta, 2005).
Significant research effort has been devoted to examining the implications
of labor migration for a number of labor-exporting countries.2 Nevertheless,
the substantial migration flows which have occurred since the 1990s among
and out of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and in particu-
lar out of the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—have re-
mained outside the focus of the existing literature on migration.3 Migration-
related empirical research in the South Caucasus context has been limited pri-
marily by a lack of reliable and systematic data and, although abundant, only
anecdotal evidence has accrued on the intensity of emigration and its economic
implications.
The present study provides the first empirical evidence, based on microeco-
nomic data from a well-designed household survey, on recent migration from
the South Caucasus and its economic implications for the region. The study
uses data from the Social-Economic Assessment of Households in the South
Caucasus, available from the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC).
Although not designed exclusively for research on migration, the dataset pro-
vides a sufficient basis to explore major questions posed by the existing theo-
retical and empirical literature on migration as well as to make cross-country
comparisons. Besides quantifying and describing the migration flows from the
three economies, this study contributes to the migration research by providing
preliminary evidence on the possible economic consequences of migration in
the South Caucasus, such as the impact on brain drain, entrepreneurship, and
household investment in education.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that South Caucasian migrants
2See Edwards and Ureta (2003), McKenzie (2005), McKenzie and Rapoport (2006), and Yang
(2008) for the impact on educational attainment and Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002), Konica
and Filer (2009), Lucas (1987), Woodruff and Zenteno (2007), and Yang (2008) for the impact of
migration on private sector development.
3According to various sources, close to one fourth of the Armenian and Georgian populations
have emigrated either legally or illegally during the first decade of economic transition, and the
annual remittance inflows to Georgia added up to about one fifth of the country’s GDP in 2003
according to the United Nations Association of Georgia (UNAG). Indeed, both Armenia and Geor-
gia are estimated to be among the developing countries with the highest remittances received as
a percentage of GDP (IMF, World Bank, OECD). See Table 1.1 in the Appendix for a comparison
with other major labor-exporting countries.
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are primarily males, relatively older than the non-migrants, and their purpose
of migration is to work in neighboring Russia. While migration from the re-
gion does not involve mass emigration of highly educated individuals, higher
incomes from abroad are not associated with higher propensity to spend on
education among migrants’ households. However, a significant correlation be-
tween having a migrant household member and presence of a family business
in Armenia suggests that migrants’ earnings and remittances have the poten-
tial to relieve liquidity and risk constraints and to contribute to the develop-
ment of the private sector in the region.
Literature Review
The traditional economic research (Borjas, 1987, 1999; Harris and Todaro, 1970,
among others) models migration as a result of income-maximizing individuals
moving to regions where their expected earnings less the costs of migration are
higher than in their home region. An important strand of this literature studies
how migrants compare to non-migrants in terms of skill and earnings distri-
butions. Borjas (1987) uses the Roy (1951) model to argue that the selection of
migrants depends on the wage distribution of the home country compared to
the host country and predicts that in countries where the returns to education
and the dispersion of wages are relatively high, the migrants are negatively
selected—those who migrate have below-average skill levels. Alternatively, in
countries where returns to education and wage dispersion are relatively low,
the migrants are positively selected.
More recently, the negative selection hypothesis of Borjas (1987) has been
re-examined by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005). Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) fol-
low Borjas (1987, 1999) but argue that migration costs have an important role
in migrant selection and that migration costs decline with skill level. In their
model lower returns to education in the host country discourage high-skilled
individuals from migrating, while high cost of migration discourage the low-
skilled. As a result, the migrants are likely to be drawn from the middle of
the skill distribution in the home country. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) also
analyse Mexican and U.S. data and find evidence of intermediate to positive
self-selection on observable skills among Mexican migrants, which supports
their hypothesis.
The selection of migrants affects the skill and productivity distribution of
those who remain behind and thus the economic development of the migrants’
home countries. In view of the predictions of the theoretical literature and
the empirical findings from other labor-exporting countries, in the subsequent
4
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analysis I test for a relationship between educational attainment and migration
decisions in the South Caucasus.
The present study is also related to a rapidly expanding strand of migration
literature which examines the economic impact of remittances on migrants’
home region through their effect on productive investment. Taylor (1999) dis-
tinguishes between two major theoretical approaches to migration, which lead
to different hypotheses about the impact of remittances on migrant-sending
economies. Most of the empirical research on labor migration, which focuses
on the sending economies, searches for evidence supporting either of the two
theoretical approaches.
The first approach is related to the New Economics of Labor Migration
and views migration as a “development tool” for the sending areas (Stark and
Bloom, 1985; Taylor, 1999). Its proponents argue that migration is the result
of a joint decision of household members4 aimed at overcoming local capi-
tal and risk market failures, and remittances are motivated by informal insur-
ance contracts between migrants and non-migrants within the same house-
hold.5 Migrants’ remittances can thus relieve capital and risk constraints and
thereby stimulate productive investments and entrepreneurship in migrant-
sending economies (Stark and Bloom, 1985). This implies that migration and
remittances should be associated with human and physical capital accumu-
lation. A significant number of studies indeed find a positive correlation be-
tween migration and investment in education (Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Yang,
2008) and entrepreneurship among migrant-sending households (Dustmann
and Kirchkamp, 2002; Konica and Filer, 2009; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007;
Yang, 2008).
According to the model of fertility by Becker and Tomes (1976), poor par-
ents may be making smaller than the optimal investments in their children’s
education due to borrowing constraints. The model predicts that, as their in-
comes rise, parents will be willing to invest more in their children’s education
until the marginal return to investment equals the interest rate. Based on this,
Edwards and Ureta (2003) study the effect of remittance income on school at-
tendance in El Salvador. Consistent with the theory, Edwards and Ureta (2003)
find evidence that by relaxing the budget constraints of remittance-receiving
households, remittances allow parents in El Salvador to keep their children in
4The assumption is closely linked to an important strand of literature starting with Becker’s the-
ory of social interactions (Becker, 1974), which suggests that in migration and remittances research
the unit of analysis should be the family, rather than the individual.
5A number of studies (Lucas and Stark, 1985, for instance) provide empirical support for the hy-
pothesis that migrants act as insurance against risks associated with family businesses and family
income. Lucas and Stark (1985) study the remittance behavior of migrants in Botswana. Con-
trolling for migrant earnings, they find that migrants send significantly more remittances to those
families that are at risk of income loss due to drought.
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school longer.6
Despite strong theoretical arguments suggesting that migration increases
investment in human capital in migrants’ households, recent empirical evi-
dence has been contradictory. McKenzie (2005) provides preliminary evidence
from Mexico that sixteen- to eighteen-year-old children in migrant households
have lower levels of schooling than their contemporaries who live in non-
migrant households. Several explanations for the negative impact of migration
on child education are suggested. One possibility is that children of migrat-
ing parents are likely to migrate themselves; therefore, they are more likely to
quit school earlier than their contemporaries. The migrants’ children may also
obtain less adult supervision or substitute housework for schooling. Alterna-
tively, based on the earlier theoretical and empirical work of Borjas (1987) and,
more recently, on the work of Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), if the income distri-
bution is more unequal in the migrants’ home country than in the host country,
the returns to education for the migrants would be higher in their home coun-
try than in the host country. Thus, children of migrants who also expect to
emigrate have less incentive to invest in their education in the country where
they were born.
The contradictory evidence of the impact of migration on educational at-
tainment demonstrates that the mechanism through which migration affects
household schooling decisions is complex. In a further study that builds on
McKenzie (2005), McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) separate the remittance from
the migration effect on educational attainment and show that, although re-
mittances tend to relax credit constraints on investment in education for the
very poor, for the majority of rural Mexican children, family migration has a
negative effect on educational attainment. In this paper I adopt a different
approach and examine the relationship between migration and investment in
human capital by testing the hypothesis that households with migrants are
more likely to have education-related expenditures, compared to households
without migrants.
Migrants’ earnings are also an important source of capital for credit con-
strained entrepreneurial households. Recent theoretical and empirical research
supports this argument. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) consider remit-
tances as either a strategy to overcome capital constraints related to starting up
a business or as savings to finance leisure activities. They develop a model in
which migration durations are chosen jointly with the planned post-migration
activities. The conjecture implies that the optimal duration of migration should
6Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that household budgets have a small but significant effect on
the hazard of leaving school in both urban and rural areas of El Salvador and the effect of remit-
tances on the hazard of leaving school is larger than the effect of any other type of income. For the
rural areas of El Salvador, the presence of remittances lowers the hazard of leaving school.
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differ across post-migration activity choices. The study also uses survey data
on the post-migration activities of returned Turkish migrants and finds evi-
dence in support of that hypothesis, i.e., higher wages abroad, together with
post-migration self-employment, are associated with shorter migration dura-
tions.
In another study Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) argue that migrant networks
help alleviate capital constraints and reduce the cost of capital. Woodruff and
Zenteno (2007) use survey data from self-employed workers and small firm
owners to estimate the impact of attachment to migration networks on the
levels of capital investment, capital-output ratios, sales, and profits of small
businesses in Mexico. The impact of the proximity to migration networks is
identified by the historical geographic pattern of migration from Mexico to
the United States as defined by rail lines. The study provides support for the
theoretical argument that access to remittance flows lowers the cost of capital,
and thus is associated with larger investments and higher profits among small
businesses. In capital-intensive sectors, migration networks are also associated
with higher output levels as well, which suggests that remittances also help
overcome capital constraints in these sectors.
While proponents of the New Economics of Labor Migration view migra-
tion as a “development tool,” there are researchers who share a more sceptical
view on the role of migration and remittances and argue that migration de-
prives migrant-sending economies of labor and capital, and remittances lead
to dependency and lack of development (Taylor, 1999). Chami et al. (2003), for
instance, model remittances as compensatory transfers made by altruistic mi-
grants to their families in the home economy. The remittances are intended to
aid the migrant’s family in cases of adverse economic outcomes. However, a
moral hazard problem between the migrant and the non-migrant family mem-
bers may result in non-migrants reducing their job search efforts and labor
supply, and relying on remittances. This may lead to a decrease in economic
activity in the migrant-sending economy. Such predictions would imply that
migration and remittances have no effect on the entrepreneurial activities of
the migrant households.
In this work I attempt to establish a relationship between migration and re-
mittances and running one’s own household business in the South Caucasian
economies. Similar evidence has been found for Albania and the Philippines
(Konica and Filer, 2009; Yang, 2008). Konica and Filer (2009) find that remit-
tances in Albania are associated with working in one’s own household busi-
ness. Yang (2008) uses the 1997 Asian crisis and the corresponding depreciation
of the Philippine peso as an exogenous source of variation in the value of the
remittances received by Philippine families from migrants working in different
7
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countries. The study finds that overall, more favorable exchange rate shocks
allow the Philippine migrant households to increase self-employment hours,
to invest more in child schooling, and to invest in relatively capital-intensive
start-up household businesses.7
This paper focuses on recent emigration from a region that has remained
out of the scope of the existing research on migration. Theoretical research
and empirical evidence from other countries cannot provide a clear answer to
whether the South Caucasian economies win or lose from international migra-
tion. The preliminary evidence on the consequences of migration in the South
Caucasus discussed in this paper thus fills a gap in the empirical literature
on migration by shedding light on the region’s development potential and the
likely drawbacks related to cross-border migration.
Data
Data Source
This study uses data from the first two waves of a household survey, the Social-
Economic Assessment of Households in South Caucasus, undertaken simulta-
neously in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, in May-June 2004 and in April-
June 2005, by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC).8 The primary
purpose of the survey was to collect comparable data to prepare various projects
and programs for the general development of the region, while harmonizing
the data-collecting methods, polling, and interviewing among the three coun-
tries. The number of households which were selected randomly and inter-
viewed in 2004 in Yerevan, Baku, and Tbilisi was 1,500, 1,489, and 1,472, re-
spectively. In 2005 the survey was extended beyond the capital cities to cover
one additional administrative region in each country. The number of inter-
viewed households in each capital city or administrative region in 2005 was
750.9 The data totaled approximately 9,000 households and 37,000 household
7Yang (2008) notes, however, that the study does not separate possible wealth effects due to the
exchange rate shocks from pure migration and remittance effects.
8The data and related documentation are downloadable free of charge from http://www.
crrccenters.org/.
9In Armenia the 2005 survey was conducted in Yerevan and the Kotayk region; in Azerbaijan, in
Baku and the the Aran region – Mugan zone; and in Georgia, in Tbilisi and the Shida Kartli region.
The Kotayk region is located in the immediate vicinity of the capital, Yerevan. It occupies 7 percent
of the territory of Armenia and its population is approximately 9 percent of the total population of
the country. The Aran economic region occupies the Caspian Sea area to the Southwest of Baku. Its
territory is 25 percent of the territory of Azerbaijan and its population is approximately 21 percent
of the total population of the country. Shida Kartli is located in the central part of Georgia, to
the Northwest of Tbilisi. The region occupies 23 percent of the territory of the country and its
population is 7 percent of the total population of Georgia. The northern part of Shida Kartli, which
is part of the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia and which has not been under the control
of the Georgian government since 1994, is not covered by the survey.
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members of all ages, 27,000 of whom are capital city residents. The data col-
lected in 2004 is representative at the capital city level in each country and the
data collected in 2005 is representative at the level of the capital cities and the
three administrative regions.
The sampling technique is multistage cluster sampling through stratifica-
tion. The sampling frame in Armenia is the Armenian Electricity Grid Com-
pany’s household list, while the sampling frames in Georgia and Azerbaijan
are the district lists of the most recent population censuses prior to the survey
date—the Georgian General Population Census (2002) and the Azeri Popula-
tion Census (1999). The Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) in Armenia is the elec-
tricity branch, and in Azerbaijan and in Georgia the census districts. The strata
in Armenia are defined in line with the division of the electricity branches set
by the Electricity Grid Company. In Azerbaijan and Georgia the strata are
defined according to the district divisions. The number of sampled PSUs is
defined proportionately to the number of households within each assigned
stratum. One respondent was selected from each household through the Kish
Table methodology and interviewed in person. The respondents from each
household represent the final sampling units.
The survey contains data on the households’ general characteristics, de-
mography, education, emigration, health, political activities and views, social
institutions, crime, and household economic behavior. A household is defined
as a group of people “who usually live together, comprise one economic unit,
and have a common budget.” The respondents are asked to provide informa-
tion on all members of the household, including those members who are absent
or residing abroad during the interview.
This paper uses data derived from the household general characteristics,
emigration, and economic behavior sections of the survey. The general char-
acteristics section provides information on the sex, age, education, and rela-
tionship to the head of household for all household members. The migration
section of the survey supplies information on those members of the household
who have spent three or more months abroad during the three years preceding
the interview, as well as the purpose of their stay abroad. This makes it possi-
ble to compare the major reasons for migration in the South Caucasus and to
identify those households that have or have previously had members residing
abroad. Data on individual contributions to household income is drawn from
the section on economic behavior. This section also contains data on the house-
holds’ monthly expenditures on education. All incomes and expenditures are
reported in U.S. dollars.
The survey covers the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of
the non-migrants in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as well as of those
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members of the households who have stayed abroad for a minimum of three
months during the period 2001-2005. No information on those household mem-
bers who have migrated prior to that period is available. Therefore, the focus
of the present study is current temporary migration from the South Caucasian
households, conditional on the households not having migrated due to socio-
political or economic reasons during the first decade of economic transition.
A limitation of the study is the regional coverage of the survey. The house-
hold survey data cover only the capital cities and one additional non-capital
region in each country. Thus, any possible differences in the economic behav-
ior across administrative, territorial, and economic regions within each coun-
try are not controlled for. In addition, information on the labor market par-
ticipation of the non-migrants is limited, i.e., data are available only on the
non-migrants’ monthly contributions to household income, but not on their
particular occupation. The data also do not clearly differentiate labor market
non-participation from non-reporting of household income contribution. Nev-
ertheless, this survey is the only available comparable source of data for a set
of important migration-related questions in the South Caucasus.
Variable Definitions
For each member of the interviewed households, the dataset contains infor-
mation on whether the person has emigrated at least once with a minimum
duration of three months during the three-year period prior to the interview
date. Although partial, this information allows for the identification of mi-
grant household members (previous and current) and the households with
such members. In addition, the survey contains information on the purpose
of each migrant’s stay abroad and the country of destination. The major rea-
sons for a prolonged stay abroad among South Caucasian migrants are edu-
cation, work, and reunification with another migrant family member. Table
1.2 presents the number of household members whose migration is associated
with “education,” “family reunification,” and “work” as a percentage of all
household members of working age (16-65), as well as the percentage of house-
holds with such migrants in each capital city and administrative region where
the survey was conducted.
According to Salt (1992), the term “labor migrant” constitutes a slightly
broader definition than does the term “work migrant” used in the dataset for
this study. In Salt’s (1992) broader definition, labor migrants are also house-
hold members who emigrate for family reunification reasons and subsequently
become labor migrants on their own. Based on this argument, I create a di-
chotomous variable indicating the migrant status of a household member. The
10
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variable equals one for those household members who either worked or stayed
abroad for “family reunification” reasons for more than three months, and zero
for the rest of the household members. The household members whose migra-
tion purpose was education are not considered migrants for the purpose of the
subsequent analysis.10
The actual purpose of migration is undoubtedly important for defining mi-
gration status in an analysis of the economic implications of migration. A ma-
jor consideration for the analysis, by treating as migrants household members
who declare both work and joining a migrant family member already abroad,
is that the migration questions refer only to migration episodes that exceed
three months. This implies that any individual in the dataset who joins and
supports a migrant family member abroad with paid or unpaid work does not
actively participate in the labor market or the economic life of the home coun-
try for an extensive period of time. In addition, both types of migrants imply
the presence of a migrant family member, and by excluding the “family re-
unification” migrants when identifying households with migrants, there is an
increased risk of measurement error. Another important consideration behind
pooling the “work” and “family reunification” migrants together is that at the
time of the survey, the legal opportunities for Georgian nationals to work in
a foreign country, including Russia, were practically non-existent. Georgian
respondents may thus misreport work migration by disguising it as “family
reunification” migration. Indeed, the number of “family reunification” mi-
grants from Tbilisi is significantly higher than the other capitals and regions
where the survey was conducted and where the number of “family reunifi-
cation” migrants is negligible. I treat both “work” and “family reunification”
types of migration as indicative of migrant status so as to include those Geor-
gian migrants who might have not been reported by the respondent household
member as working during their stay abroad for security reasons.11
The age of each household member is computed based on the reported birth
date and the date of the interview. The binary variables for educational attain-
ment are based on completed educational level. Individuals who completed
primary school but not secondary school are considered to have a primary edu-
cation; those with completed secondary, secondary technical and partial higher
education are considered as having a secondary education; individuals with
completed higher education and doctoral/scientific degrees are considered to
have a higher education. The survey does not indicate the marital status of
each household member; this information is determined indirectly through in-
10Other reported reasons for migration are business trips, holiday, therapy, and permanent resi-
dency. I exclude this type of migration from indicating migrant status as well.
11For a comparison, Table 1.3 gives the number of migrants per household both with “family
reunification” migrants and without “family reunification” migrants.
11
Characteristics of Migration Flows from the South Caucasus Chapter 1
formation on the relationship to the head of household and the gender of each
household member.
In defining the household characteristics variables, household size refers to
the total number of household members, and the number of adult household
members indicates the number of individuals older than 16. “Second language
at home” is a dichotomous variable where one indicates households, or indi-
viduals from households, where the primary language of communication is
different from the official language of the country or where there is a second
language which is commonly used among household members. “Other mi-
grants” is a binary variable which aims to capture the effect of possible house-
hold migration networks or migration channel formed by previous migrants
from the same household. The variable equals one if the household has re-
ported more than one migrant member.
Data on the monthly contribution to the household income for each house-
hold member as well as the expenditures on education and the total household
income from all sources is derived from the economic behavior section of the
survey. A household with income in the lowest quartile for the region is con-
sidered a lower-income household. Data on whether a household runs its own
family business is not available. However, it is possible to determine this infor-
mation from the economic behavior section which contains data on the sources
of household income. A dichotomous variable for the presence of a “house-
hold business” thus equals one if a household has declared that one of the first
three primary sources of their income is income from a family business.
Characteristics of Migration Flows from the South
Caucasus
Following the collapse of communism, the South Caucasus experienced con-
siderable migration outflows. Above ten percent of Armenian, seven percent
of Georgian, and four percent of Azeri households in the sample I work with
report having at least one member who spent more than three months abroad
between 2001 and 2005. Table 1.2 lists the percentage of migrants by country,
region, and the reason for their migration. The highest emigration rates among
the male population in the South Caucasus are from Armenia; the primary rea-
son for nearly all their migration is to work abroad. Although the migration
rate among Armenian females is also relatively high compared to female mi-
gration from Azerbaijan and non-capital Georgia, Armenian females migrate
much less than do males.
By contrast, the female residents of Tbilisi tend to migrate almost as much
12
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as the males, not only for family reunification reasons, but also for work and
education. This, however, does not apply to the non-capital region of Geor-
gia where the migration rates among both males and females are the lowest
among the three countries (Table 1.2). The share of reported work migration in
Georgia is also very low compared to Armenia and Azerbaijan. As explained
in the previous section, this, in addition to the relatively large share of reported
migration for family reunification reasons, may reflect misreporting of the rea-
son for migration due to the lack of legal opportunities for Georgians to work
abroad and visa restrictions with possible destination countries, including Rus-
sia.
Similar to Georgia, there is a significant difference between the emigration
patterns of the capital and the non-capital residents of Azerbaijan. While the
estimated migration rate among the non-capital residents is rather high, the
number of migrants from Baku remains negligible (Table 1.2). One possible
explanation for this difference is the better economic opportunities available
to Baku residents owing to Azerbaijan’s large oil resources and oil industry.
The relatively high migration rate among the non-capital residents of Azer-
baijan may signify that these opportunities are not equally distributed across
the country. Thus, working abroad is a lucrative opportunity for those Azeri
citizens who live outside the capital city.
Since it is primarily male household members who migrate, I focus on
male migrants whose migration purpose is family reunification and work, and
present in Table 1.4 the estimated work and family reunification migrant shares
by home and host country. Despite the large earnings differentials, the West-
ern economies attract few male migrants from the region. According to the
estimates based on the survey data, Russia is the most common destination
for male working-age migrants from the region, 78% of the Armenian, 90% of
the Azeri, and 34% of the Georgian male migrants having spent at least one
migration episode in Russia. This is likely due to the relatively lower cost of
migration to Russia than elsewhere, given the geographic proximity and lack
of a language barrier.
Compared to Armenia and Azerbaijan, migration from Georgia to high-
income OECD countries is almost as common as migration to Russia among the
male population. During the period for which the respondents were asked to
report migrations within the household—up to three years before the interview—
the visa restrictions imposed by the Russian Federation likely posed a signif-
icant additional emigration cost to Russia for Georgian citizens, thus making
Russia a less attractive destination for Georgians than for their South Caucasian
neighbors.
The existing literature on migration has established that migrants are gen-
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erally young, male, and relatively less-skilled than non-migrants. A cursory
examination of the individual characteristics of migrants from the South Cau-
casus, however, reveals a slightly different profile of a “typical” migrant from
the region. Table 1.5 gives a summary of the socio-economic characteristics
of migrants relative to non-migrants. South Caucasian migrants are predom-
inantly male but appear to be somewhat older than the non-migrants in all
three countries. Heads of households or sons of the head of the household are
more likely to migrate. In Georgia, higher education is more common among
migrants than non-migrants. Unlike migrants from Georgia, male migrants
from Armenia and Azerbaijan are more likely to be married than single, while
the opposite holds for female migrants. Finally, the migrants’ average monthly
contribution to the income of their household is significantly higher than that
of the non-migrants in all three countries in the region.
Results
Socio-demographic Determinants of Migration in the South Cau-
casus
The logistic regression results reported in Table 1.6 in terms of odds ratios con-
firm that gender and age matter for the decision to migrate in the South Cau-
casus. In all three countries, older working-age individuals are more likely to
be migrants and each additional year of age increases that probability. This re-
sult differs from the findings of many previous empirical studies on migration
that have established that international migrants tend to be relatively younger
males. Yet another result that contradicts previous findings is that in Georgia,
at least, gender does not appear to be a significant determinant of migration.
Similar to other findings, however, single individuals from the South Caucasus
are more likely to become migrants than married ones. Controlling for other
characteristics in the logistic regression, I estimate that being married becomes
associated with a significantly lower probability of emigrating for males from
the capital of Armenia, females from the non-capital region of Azerbaijan, and
both males and females living in the capital of Georgia.
Education appears to be an important determinant for migration only in
the capital city of Azerbaijan, Baku, where having higher education increases
the probability of becoming a migrant more than two times for males and more
than six times for females. The small number of migrants from Baku, however,
together with the statistically insignificant effects of higher education found
for all other regions implies that emigration from the South Caucasus does not
involve emigration of the more educated and highly-skilled individuals. Thus,
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the dangers of brain drain discussed in the literature on migration are not likely
to materialize in the case of the South Caucasus.
In the capital city of Armenia and Azerbaijan, using more than one lan-
guage at home is associated with a higher probability of a household mem-
ber becoming a migrant. As the most commonly reported second language is
Russian, those Armenian and Azeri households which report using a second
language at home are likely ethnically mixed. It might be easier for such house-
holds to send migrants to Russia, as relations with extended families across the
border can significantly reduce the cost of migration.
Although the direction of causality cannot be determined, having other mi-
grating family members from the household is correlated with several times
higher probability of being a migrant in all South Caucasian countries. Since it
is possible that this result is explained by considering as migrants some female
household members who migrate for the sole purpose of joining their spouses
abroad, I estimate the logistic regression for all six regions only for the male
household members. As the females are more likely to reunify with migrant
members abroad, rather than be the first migrants from the household, a com-
parison of the results after excluding the females from the sample serves as a
robustness check for the results presented in Table 1.6.12 After excluding the
females, the estimated effects of the presence of other migrant household mem-
bers remain of the same magnitude and are significant at the 1% level for all
regions except for the non-capital regions of Azerbaijan and Georgia, where the
coefficients become insignificant. However, it should be noted that no migrants
from the non-capital region of Georgia are reported as “family reunification”
migrants, and this type of migrant from the non-capital region of Azerbaijan
is extremely rare. Therefore it seems likely that, in the South Caucasus, mem-
bers from the same household do not migrate alone but rather form household
“migration channels” (see Table 1.3 for the distribution of households with dif-
ferent numbers of migrants in each region).
An attempt to control explicitly for household size, the presence of young
children in the household, and for the number of children, results in statis-
tically insignificant estimates of the effect of these variables. I therefore use
other means to capture the effect of household composition on the probability
of becoming a migrant. A higher ratio of the number of household members
who are likely to work (aged 21-65) to the total number of household mem-
bers implies a higher propensity to migrate in the capital of Armenia and the
non-capital region in Georgia. With respect to income, with the exception of
12Initially, I attempted to perform the analysis considering as migrants only those members who
are reported as migrants for work reasons. However, insufficient data prevents me from perform-
ing such an analysis for all regions.
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the non-capital region of Georgia, migrants are more likely to originate from
households that are relatively less wealthy. In Baku, for instance, living in a
household with total income in the lowest quartile for the region is associated
with a nearly eight times higher probability of migration.
Due to the very low number of migrants to high-income OECD countries
from Azerbaijan and the non-capital regions of Armenia and Georgia in the
sample, the analysis of the determinants of migration to a high-income OECD
country as opposed to a low-income OECD or non-OECD country is limited
to the capital cities of Armenia and Georgia only (Table 1.7). Nevertheless, it
becomes apparent that there are important differences in the composition of
migrants across the regions in terms of gender, age, marital status and educa-
tional attainment. In Yerevan, for instance, the odds of becoming a migrant
to a low-income OECD or non-OECD country, compared to not migrating at
all, are more than fifteen times higher if the household member is male. The
gender effect on migrating to a high-income OECD country is much smaller—
the probability to migrate to a high-income OECD country, as opposed to not
migrating at all, is only about three times higher if the individual is male. In
contrast, gender has a much smaller effect on migration to a low-income OECD
or non-OECD country in the capital of Georgia, and the variable is statistically
insignificant for migration to a high-income OECD country. The increase in
the probability to migrate with each additional year of age is highest for mi-
gration to a low-income OECD or non-OECD country from the Armenian cap-
ital. While both male and female individuals from the Georgian capital have a
more than 50% lower probability of migration to a high-income OECD country
if they are married, in Armenia I find a similar statistically significant effect
of being married only in the case of males migrating to low-income OECD or
non-OECD countries. Interestingly, while individuals with higher education
are not more likely to become migrants in general, having higher education
is nevertheless associated with nearly two to four times higher probability of
migration to a high-income OECD country for both females and males from
the Armenian and Georgian capitals. This result is important in view of the
underlying theoretical arguments that skill distribution and returns to educa-
tion in the host country in comparison to the home country affect the selection
of migrants. The results are more in line with the predictions of the modi-
fied Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) model rather than the model of Borjas (1987),
which suggests that the cost of migration plays a very important role in the
decision to migrate in the South Caucasus. One possible explanation for the
results is that the better educated individuals are likely to speak foreign lan-
guages other than Russian and may find it easier to obtain information about
the labor market conditions in high-income OECD countries, which reduces
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the cost of migration to such destinations. The estimated effect of the variable
indicating usage of a second language at home further supports this argument.
Using another language at home (primarily Russian) increases the probability
of migration only to low-income OECD or non-OECD countries in Armenia
and in Georgia. While brain drain does not appear to be a widespread phe-
nomenon in the South Caucasus, these findings also suggest that the likely rea-
son for this are the higher costs of migration, including costs due to a language
barrier, to geographically more distant high-income countries.13
It should be noted that a disadvantage of the survey is that only house-
hold members who emigrated during the 2001-2005 period are identified as
migrants. This implies that there might be household members who have emi-
grated earlier or have emigrated permanently and are no longer considered to
be members of the household by the respondents and thus are missed by the
survey. In addition, the survey may also miss many households with migrants
because the entire household has left the country before the survey was con-
ducted. These features of the data can introduce bias due to sample selection
as those who emigrated earlier, permanently, or left no household member be-
hind might have different characteristics than the migrants identified by the
survey.
Intense permanent migration during the first years of the transition might
have affected the skill distribution of the remaining work force in the South
Caucasus. For instance, if highly educated migrants were able to permanently
settle abroad earlier by being more likely to secure better employment abroad,
the coefficient on educational attainment on the decision to migrate could be
biased downwards. One cannot entirely exclude the possibility that the little
difference in educational attainment between migrants and non-migrants, at
least in Armenia and Azerbaijan, or the finding that the South Caucasian mi-
grants tend to be relatively older than the non-migrants, contrary to existing
results from other countries, are due to some sample selection bias inherent in
the data I use.
Although the literature on migration and sample selection is extensive, this
kind of problem is inherent in most studies that use survey data. Without ex-
tensive longitudinal data on the intensity of earlier migration and on the mi-
grants’ skill level, which could suggest the direction of the possible sample-
selection bias, one can only speculate on the impact on the results. Indeed,
very few studies acknowledge this type of problem and attempt to deal with it.
Hanson and Woodruff (2003), for example, study the relationship between ed-
13I also define as migrants the household members whose purpose of migration is education
and replicate the analysis presented in this paper, as it might be that the “students” abroad are in
fact workers. There is no significant change in the results that would suggest that this is the case.
The results of all robustness checks are available upon request.
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ucational attainment and migration only in rural areas of Mexico, where entire
households are less likely to emigrate in comparison to urban areas. With re-
spect to permanent and temporary migration, Constant and Massey (2003) use
data covering fourteen years to examine return migration from Germany and
find no selectivity with respect to human capital or gender among the migrants
who choose to stay and those who choose to return to their home country.
Migrant – Non-migrant Income Gaps
Higher earnings of family members who work abroad and remittances increase
domestic demand and consumption and indirectly contribute to the economic
development of migrant-sending economies. This motivates an analysis of the
differences in earnings between migrants and non-migrants. Data on the exact
earnings of migrants abroad is not available; however, the reported monthly
contribution to household income is of interest since it represents the migrants’
monthly income spent exclusively in the migrants’ home economy.
Table 1.8 contains the migrant – non-migrant raw income gaps from Oaxaca-
Blinder decompositions of the contribution to household income conditioning
on different sets of individual and household characteristics. The results pre-
sented in Table 1.8 also indicate that even after controlling for various observ-
able characteristics, the gaps between the contributions of migrants and non-
migrants remain large in all regions. The largest income gains from migration
are in the non-capital region of Armenia and the lowest gains are in the capitals
of Armenia and Georgia.
The purpose of the decomposition is to compare the contributions of mi-
grants and non-migrants with similar household and individual characteris-
tics. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition approach, however, relies on restric-
tive parametric assumptions about the functional form of the income contribu-
tion conditional expectation function, which could bias the results if there are
significant differences in the supports of the empirical distributions of the char-
acteristics of migrant and non-migrant household members. For example, the
lower representation of individuals with certain characteristics, i.e. females,
among the migrants implies that a large number of migrants and non-migrants
from the data cannot be compared, i.e., there is a lack of “common support”
problem.
Thus, in addition to the results of the linear regression model used in the
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions presented in Table 1.8, I use a non-parametric
matching approach to account for the differences in the “support” of individual
and household characteristics without imposing a linear functional form.14 The
14Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide a useful review of the procedure. The Stata module
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alternative decomposition technique relies on comparing only contributions to
household income of “matched” migrants and non-migrants with similar set
of observable characteristics.
The propensity score matching results, which are presented in Table 1.9,
confirm those of the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions and imply that the income
gains from migration for the South Caucasian countries are significant. Even
after only “matched” migrants and non-migrants with similar characteristics
are compared, migrant’s contribution to household income remain substantial.
Running a Family Business and Spending on Education in the
South Caucasus
The recent economic literature on migration places strong emphasis on the us-
age of migrants’ earnings and remittances by the migrants’ households and
on distinguishing between consumption goods and investment in human and
physical capital. The results of an analysis on the relationship between migra-
tion and running a household business are presented in Table 1.10. Although
the direction of the causal relationship between migration and entrepreneur-
ship cannot be clearly determined, migration of a household member is asso-
ciated with a higher probability of running a business in the capital cities of
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
It is not possible to distinguish between the separate effects of remittances
and migrant household members. Nevertheless, whenever the data allows I
attempt to distinguish between the effect of having household members solely
in non-OECD or lower-income OECD countries and having migrants in high-
income OECD countries. This is possible in the case of Armenia and for the
pooled Georgian sample. The results reveal significant differences between the
two countries.
While in Armenia migrations to low-income OECD or non-OECD coun-
tries are associated with a higher probability of running a household business,
in Georgia migrations to high-income OECD countries are associated with a
lower probability of running a family business. It is likely that these effects are
the result of local demand conditions. Lack of business opportunities might
be a push factor for migration in Georgia, especially to high-income countries,
while in Armenia, the relatively less costly migration to Russia may be consid-
ered an opportunity for accumulating start-up capital for a family business. It
is thus possible that the cost of migration plays an important role in the devel-
opment of the private sector in these South Caucasian economies.
Most likely due to the fact that higher education is available tuition free in
PSMATCH2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) was used to perform the propensity score matching.
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all three South Caucasian countries, I detect a significant relationship between
migration and spending on education only for the sample from the non-capital
region of Azerbaijan (see Table 1.11). The results do not exclude the possibility
that higher incomes from abroad allow the children in migrant households to
spend more time in school relative to the children in non-migrant households.
Without detailed data on schooling decisions or remittances, however, it is not
possible to explore further the relationship between migration, remittances,
and investment in human capital in the South Caucasus.
Conclusion
Based on a well-designed household survey from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia, this study quantifies the migration flows from the South Caucasus
and provides the first preliminary evidence on the economic impact of emigra-
tion on the economic development of the region. Results show that the most
common destination for recent migrants from the South Caucasus is Russia and
that the most common purpose of migration is to work abroad. An analysis of
the demographic and socio-economic determinants of migration suggests that
current migration from the South Caucasus does not involve mass migration of
the skilled. However, this is likely due to the relatively high cost of emigration
to high-income countries.
While individuals with higher education are not more likely to become
migrants in general, having higher education is nevertheless associated with
nearly a two to four times higher probability of migration to a high-income
OECD country for both females and males from the Armenian and Georgian
capitals. This evidence from the South Caucasus is also important in view
of the underlying theoretical arguments that skill distribution and returns to
education in the host country in comparison to the home country affect the se-
lection of migrants. The results are in line with the conjectures of Chiquiar and
Hanson (2005) that the cost of migration play an important role in the decision
to migrate.
Further analysis also reveals that emigration can indirectly enhance eco-
nomic development of the South Caucasian region by raising local incomes
and demand. Although migration is not associated with higher probability
of spending on education among the migrants’ households, a significant cor-
relation between migration and the presence of family business in Armenia
suggests that the earnings of the migrants can provide scarce capital for busi-
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2004
Armenia 4.44 5.51 5.98 9.39 -4.94
Azerbaijan 1.82 2.90 2.35 2.62 -1.78
Georgia 5.62 6.80 5.96 5.91 -8.30
Guatemala 3.02 6.88 8.63 9.46 -4.54
Mexico 1.63 1.70 2.33 2.65 -3.05
Philippines 8.08 9.67 13.38 12.91 -1.78
Source : World Development Indicators database 
Remittances 
Notes: (i) Remittances include the current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries 
earned by nonresident workers, presented as a percentage of the country's GDP; (ii) Net 
migration is the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including 
both citizens and noncitizens, as a percentage of the working age population (five-year 
estimates).
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Table 1.2: Migrants and Households with Migrants in the South Caucasus (%)
Capital Region
Male Female Male Female 
Households with Migrants 8.54 14.13
"Work" Migrants 6.21 1.28 9.24 0.92
"Reunification" Migrants 0.26 0.14 0.07 1.06
"Education" Migrants 0.73 0.32 0.07 0.06
Sample Size 2,242 747 2,786 3,396 1,145 1,246
Households with Migrants 1.59 9.87
"Work" Migrants 0.88 0.15 4.97 0.77
"Reunification" Migrants 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.13
"Education" Migrants 0.01 0.01 0.39 0.00
Sample Size 2,233 749 3,191 3,425 1,210 1,277
Households with Migrants 8.41 3.29
"Work" Migrants 1.77 1.03 1.53 0.62
"Reunification" Migrants 1.51 1.07 0.00 0.00
"Education" Migrants 0.44 0.99 0.51 0.13




Note: Migrants are individuals (aged 16-65) who have resided abroad for at least three 
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Table 1.4: “Work”/“Reunification” Migration from the South Caucasus by







"Work"/"Reunification" 9.94 77.88 5.45 93.27
Total Migration 13.78 80.77 5.45 100.00
"Work"/"Reunification" 0.86 89.66 5.17 95.69
Total Migration 0.86 90.52 8.62 100.00
"Work"/"Reunification" 30.40 34.40 18.40 83.20
Total Migration 41.60 36.00 22.40 100.00
Note: Migrants are individuals (aged 16-65) who have resided abroad for at least three 














Age 36.64 39.88*** 35.64 38.38*** 37.13 39.66***
(0.19) (0.63) (0.20) (1.07) (0.18) (0.94)
Male 0.44 0.80*** *** 0.47 0.83*** ** 0.47 0.58*** ***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04)
HH Head 0.21 0.34*** * 0.25 0.43*** *** 0.21 0.19 ***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03)
Son of HH Head 0.22 0.37*** 0.24 0.37*** 0.22 0.30**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 0.04
Secondary Education 0.65 0.63 *** 0.66 0.61 0.50 0.42* ***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
Higher Education 0.30 0.33 *** 0.23 0.31 * 0.44 0.56*** ***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
Married Male 0.30 0.56*** ** 0.27 0.62*** ** 0.29 0.37 ***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
Married Female 0.36 0.15*** 0.31 0.06*** *** 0.34 0.27 ***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Contribution to HH Income ($US>0) 80.61 144.42*** 83.19 130.84*** 104.95 138.87**
(1.78) (17.99) (1.49) (11.27) (3.26) (16.16)
Household Size 5.49 5.58 5.37 5.63 5.46 5.55
(0.03) (0.15) (0.04) (0.26) (0.03) (0.18)
Number of Observations 8,212 361 8,974 129 8,311 192
Notes: (i) Standard errors in parentheses; (ii) ***,**,* Denote statistically significant difference between the average characteristics of migrants and non-migrants at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively; (iii) ª Statistically significant difference between the migrants' average characteristics across the three countries. 
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
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Table 1.6: Logit Estimates for a Migrant Status: Odds Ratios
Capital Region Capital Region Capital Region
Age 1.534*** 1.285*** 1.400*** 1.466*** 1.264*** 1.784***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.18) (0.15) (0.06) (0.37)
Age Squared 0.995 0.997 0.996 0.995 0.997 0.993
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 12.963*** 9.712*** 13.127*** 3.650*** 1.669 2.048
(5.85) (5.15) (8.91) (1.66) (0.52) (1.91)
Married*Male 0.471*** 0.757 0.881 1.280 0.493** 0.964
(0.11) (0.26) (0.35) (0.50) (0.15) (0.88)
Married*Female 0.803 0.760 0.484 0.172** 0.542** 0.756
(0.34) (0.40) (0.45) (0.12) (0.14) (0.66)
Higher Education*Male 1.138 1.155 2.366*** 0.657 1.461 1.088
(0.20) (0.39) (0.79) (0.29) (0.35) (0.80)
Higher Education*Female 1.027 2.192 6.402** 1.168 1.410 0.582
(0.39) (1.11) (5.11) (1.14) (0.37) (0.58)
Second Language at Home 1.567*** 1.294 1.758* 3.386 1.003 1.032
(0.25) (0.32) (0.55) (2.89) (0.23) (1.13)
Other Migrants 4.138*** 3.666*** 5.762*** 2.319** 3.911*** 5.559**
(0.55) (0.47) (1.92) (0.83) (0.81) (3.75)
HH Members (21-65)/HH Size 2.476** 1.491 1.171 1.475 1.217 8.259*
(0.93) (0.76) (0.71) (0.78) (0.48) (10.59)
Lower Income HH 3.955*** 2.839*** 7.759*** 5.986*** 2.145*** 1.974
(0.60) (0.52) (2.51) (1.58) (0.36) (1.02)
Number of Observations 5,426 2,020 6,238 2,290 6,015 1,723
Notes: (i) Individuals aged 16-65; (ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses;(iii) ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 level, respectively.
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
29
Table 1.7: Multinomial Logit Estimates for Migrant Status of Household
Members (Aged 16-65) in Low Income OECD/Non-OECD vs. High-Income













Age 1.559*** 1.211** 1.223*** 1.121*
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07)
Age Squared 0.995 0.997 0.998 0.998
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 15.465*** 3.152** 2.770** 0.637
(7.42) (1.64) (1.17) (0.23)
Married*Male 0.517*** 0.440 0.583 0.458**
(0.12) (0.22) (0.21) (0.18)
Married*Female 0.803 0.821 0.618 0.304***
(0.38) (0.39) (0.21) (0.08)
Higher Education*Male 0.982 3.980*** 1.435 2.126**
(0.19) (1.44) (0.41) (0.80)
Higher Education*Female 0.780 3.060** 2.041* 1.864**
(0.38) (1.35) (0.75) (0.58)
Second Language at Home 1.488** 1.647 1.874** 0.440**
(0.29) (0.54) (0.48) (0.16)
Other Migrants 4.104*** 3.202*** 3.505*** 3.846***
(0.57) (0.86) (0.78) (0.76)
HH Members (21-65)/ 3.142*** 1.940 1.318 1.529
HH Size (1.35) (1.33) (0.75) (0.69)
Lower Income HH 3.907*** 2.637*** 2.045*** 1.799***
(0.69) (0.82) (0.48) (0.41)
Number of Observations
Notes: (i) Robust standard errors in parentheses; (ii) ***, **, * Denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and the 0.10 level, respectively; (iii) The base group is non-migrants; (iv) 
Azerbaijan and the non-capital regions of Armenia and Georgia are omitted from the analysis 
due to insufficient number of migrants to high-income OECD countries. 
Armenia Capital Georgia Capital
5,434 6,019
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Table 1.8: OLS Conditional (“Unexplained”) Migrant – Non-Migrant Income Gaps
Pooled Capital Region Pooled Capital Region Pooled Capital
Raw Gap 0.79 0.72 1.21 0.40 0.68 0.41 0.49 0.40
(0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.10) (0.21) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19)
Unexplained Gaps
Individual Characteristics
Age and Gender 0.31 0.23 0.78 0.20 0.48 0.22 0.27 0.19
(0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.17) (0.17)
Age, Gender, and Education 0.28 0.20 0.71 0.24 0.41 0.25 0.25 0.19
(0.10) (0.12) (0.17) (0.08) (0.14) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18)
Household Characteristics
Household Business, Second Language, etc. 0.26 0.19 0.69 0.24 0.36 0.23 0.25 0.18
(0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19)
Notes: (i) Income is a natural logarithm of the contribution to the household income variable; (ii) The presented results are the raw gaps and and the "unexplained" income 
gaps from Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions conditional on different sets of observable individual characteristics; (iii) Insufficient observations do not allow separate 
decompositions on the Georgian non-capital city sample.
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Table 1.9: Migrant – Non-Migrant Income Gaps: Propensity Score (Kernel) Matching Results
Pooled Capital Region Pooled Capital Region Pooled Capital
Unexplained Gapª 0.26 0.19 0.69 0.24 0.36 0.23 0.25 0.18
(0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19)
ATTº 0.55 0.46 0.71 0.50 0.80 0.28 0.73 0.47
(0.09) (0.12) (0.17) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.16) (0.17)
N Treated 112 72 39 57 15 43 38 37
N Control 3,897 2,922 975 4,814 3,664 1,150 3,595 2,699
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
 Notes: (I) ªOaxaca-Blinder decomposition from Table 8; (ii) ºAverage treatment on the treated (ATT) over the common support; (iii) Insufficient observations do not allow 
separate decompositions on the Georgian non-capital city sample.
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Table 1.10: Logit Estimates for Running a Family Business: Odds Ratios
Region Capital Region
Model 1Model 2 Model 1Model 2
Migrant 1.653** 0.659 3.777*** 0.522 0.760
(0.34) (0.24) (1.16) (0.25) (0.19)
Migrant High-Income 0.811 0.308** 
OECD (0.44) (0.16)
Migrant Low-Income 1.842*** 1.133
OECD/Non-OECD (0.40) (0.33)
Age Head 0.969 0.969 0.975 0.978 1.011 0.971 0.97
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Higher Education 1.121 1.138 0.569 1.141 0.402** 
of HH Head (0.15) (0.15) (0.22) (0.14) (0.16)
Higher Education 0.699***0.696***
of HH Head*Capital (0.08) (0.08)
Higher Education 1.471 1.453
of HH Head*Region (0.48) (0.48)
Number of Adults 1.445***1.446***1.161*  1.180*** 0.945 1.243***1.247***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
Working Age/HH Size 0.975 0.971 0.824 0.851 0.988
(0.29) (0.28) (0.42) (0.22) (0.49)






Number of Observations   2,228 2,228 727 2,182 733 2,865 2,865
Notes: (i) Standard errors in parentheses; (ii) ***,**,* Denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 level, respectively; (iii) "Migrant" is equal to one if the household has at least one 
member who has been abroad for more than three months for either work or family 
reunification reasons and zero otherwise; (iv) Model 2 distinguishes between migrants in 
high-income OECD countries and migrants in other countries. Since very few migrants 
from Azerbaijan and non-capital Armenia head to high-income OECD countries, Model 2 
is estimated only for the Yerevan sample and for the pooled Georgian sample. The sample 
division into capital and region for Armenia and Azerbaijan is based on the following 
Chow test results: F(5, 8730)=3.51, F(5, 8730)=5.91, F(5, 8730)=1.66 for Armenia, 




Table 1.11: Logit Estimates for Spending on Education (5 $US or more) of
Households with Members Aged 16-20: Odds Ratios
Georgia
Capital Region Capital Region Capital
Migrants 0.476 1.850 0.558 3.416** 1.089
(0.24) (0.84) (0.52) (1.76) (0.53)
Total HH Income 1.005 1.002 1.003 0.995 1.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Higher Education Head 1.087 1.542*  
(0.32) (0.34)
HH Members with Higher 6.796*** 1.506 1.663
Education/Adults (4.94) (0.52) (1.52)
Household Business 0.501*  1.395 1.093 0.789 1.222
(0.18) (0.72) (0.27) (0.40) (0.33)
Second Language at Home 2.601*** 0.404 1.114 2.466 0.852
(0.96) (0.23) (0.26) (1.95) (0.23)
Number of Children (0-6) 0.661 0.988 0.436** 0.698 0.616*  
(0.26) (0.31) (0.15) (0.26) (0.18)
Number of Children (7-15) 1.956*** 1.870*** 1.606*** 0.916 1.053
(0.46) (0.35) (0.20) (0.15) (0.20)
Number of Children (16-20) 2.289*** 1.128 1.655*** 1.039 1.018
(0.70) (0.28) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23)
Number of Children (21-24) 1.480 0.665 1.103 1.173 0.917
(0.41) (0.20) (0.16) (0.25) (0.16)
Number of HH Members 1.165 0.854 0.815** 1.331*  1.016
Age>24 (0.17) (0.13) (0.07) (0.20) (0.10)
Number of Observations 359 231 580 267 462
Armenia Azerbaijan
Notes: (i) Standard errors in parentheses; (ii) ***,**,* Denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 level, respectively; (iii) "Migrant" is equal to one if the household has at least one 
member who has been abroad for more than three months for either work or family 
reunification reasons and zero otherwise; (iv) Due to the small number of migrants, analysis 




Labor Supply in Albania
Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of international migration and remittances on labor
supply in Albania. It attempts to deal with the potential endogeneity problems inher-
ent in this type of analysis by instrumenting for the household migration decision and
remittance receipts. When an instrumental variable approach is used, the predicted ef-
fects of migration and remittances on labor supply appear significant only for males
between the age of 46 and 60. The expected negative impact on unemployment, due
to an income effect of remittances, among the female population in Albania is not con-
firmed by the data. After instrumenting, for females and for older males I obtain large
and positive coefficients for having a migrant within the family and large and negative
coefficients for receiving remittances. Although the estimated effects for the females are
insignificant at conventional levels, the magnitudes and signs of all coefficients suggest
that the OLS estimates of the effect of migration are likely biased downwards, while
the OLS estimates of the effect of remittances are biased upwards, compared to the true
effects of these variables.
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The total number of migrants worldwide has doubled over the past several
decades and migrant remittances have become the second largest source of ex-
ternal funding for developing countries after foreign direct investment (FDI)
(United Nations, 2004). Currently, international migration is primarily driven
by economic factors with refugees accounting for only seven percent of all
migrants (World Bank, 2008). Unsurprisingly, after the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the number of emigrants from post-Soviet countries increased
immensely. By 2005 the number of natives living abroad as a percentage of
the population of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, for example,
reached 27, 16, 23, and 17 percent, respectively (World Bank, 2008).
The emigration trends observed among the post-Soviet transitional coun-
tries vary substantially, but the Albanian economy is unique among them due
to its exceptionally large and persistent emigration and remittance flows. Ac-
cording to recent World Bank estimates, in 2005 Albania was ranked fourth in
the world in terms of its share of emigrants per population: 27.5 percent of
the Albanian population lived abroad, mostly in Greece and in Italy. By way
of comparison, the estimated shares of emigrants of other traditionally stud-
ied labor exporting countries, such as El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the
Philippines, are all much lower: 16.4, 10.7, 12.5, and 4.4 percent, respectively.
In 2006, remittances were 13 percent of Albania’s GDP, exceeding more than
three-fold the FDI as well as the total amount of development aid received by
the country. Figure 2.1 provides a summary of the migrant stock and remit-
tance estimates for Albania and other countries in the region that have expe-
rienced large emigration during recent years.1 Figure 2.2 presents workers’
remittances in Albania as share of the country’s GDP, FDI, and the official de-
velopment aid for the period 1992-2006.
The extraordinary volume of migration and remittances is likely to have
important consequences for the Albanian economy. As stressed in Rapoport
and Docquier (2006), besides the possible short-run economic consequences
through the effect on domestic prices and exchange rates, remittances may
also have long-run implications for households’ labor supply decisions, occu-
pational choice, and investment in household businesses. Figure 2.3 is based
on employment and remittances data from 2001 for Albania and other compa-
rable countries in the region. It shows linear fits between the female employ-
ment rate, the male employment rate, and the difference in percentage points
1Bosnia and Herzegovina is excluded due to the 1992-1995 period marked by the political con-
flict with Serbia and Montenegro and the resulting refugee out-flows. A large number of the dis-
placed citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have decided to permanently settle in foreign countries
not only for economic, but also for security and psychological reasons (Ibreljic et al., 2006).
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between the male and female employment rates and the shares of remittances
on GDP. The figure suggests that there might be a relationship between remit-
tances and labor force participation. However, these aggregate relationships
are based largely on the comparison of two outliers, Albania and Serbia and
Montenegro, with other migrant-sending countries, and they may be obscured
by, e.g., the selection of more employable workers into migrant status. It is
therefore important to provide a joint understanding of migration decisions
and the effect of remittances on migrant-sending households using individual
level data.
Although a large body of empirical literature studies the impact of migra-
tion on the migrant-sending economies (Borjas, 1999; Lucas, 2005), the effects
of remittances remain relatively poorly understood (Yang, 2008). Particularly
little is known to-date about the extreme case of Albania, where remittances
are an important source of income for an unusually large number of house-
holds. The restructuring of the public sector during the economic transition
in Albania was not accompanied by fast enough growth in the private sec-
tor to provide jobs for the relatively young Albanian population, which led to
soaring unemployment.2 Although the current official unemployment rates in
Albania do not appear strikingly high, actual unemployment may be several
times higher than the official data shows, exceeding 30 percent, the difference
largely attributable to the wide-spread near-subsistence farming (Central In-
telligence Agency, 2009). The only study on Albania (Konica and Filer, 2009),
which explores the effects of migration and remittances on the labor supply of
household members left behind, uses data from 1996. Based on the finding that
higher remittance incomes are associated with a lower probability of working
among Albanian females, Konica and Filer (2009) conclude that a potential eas-
ing of visa restrictions for Albanians (for example, by European Union coun-
tries) may bring considerable benefits to the Albanian economy by reducing
unemployment pressures. As Albania is approaching EU candidate status, re-
visiting the relationship between migration and the Albanian labor market has
become particularly relevant.
The current paper uses recent household survey data to study the effects
of migration and remittances on labor supply decisions of household members
who remain in Albania. I estimate the effects of having a household member
abroad and of receiving remittances, controlling for a number of individual
and household characteristics, on the probability of being involved in either
a paid or non-paid occupation. Similar to the findings by Konica and Filer
(2009) for the mid-1990s, when treating all regressors as exogenous, I find no
2According to Barjaba (2000), in 1989 19.5 percent of the Albanian population was between the
ages of 15 and 24.
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significant effect of having a household member abroad on the probability that
a household member who still lives in Albania works. However, unlike in
earlier findings, I find no significant effect of remittances on the probability that
females work, and a negative and significant (although small) effect for males.
It should be noted, however, that the total number of males in households with
migrants is relatively small.3 When an instrumental variable approach is used
to correct for the possible endogeneity of the decision to send a household
member abroad and of receiving remittances, the predicted effects of migration
and remittances on labor supply appear significant only for males between the
age of 46 and 60. The expected negative impact on unemployment among the
female population in Albania, due to an income effect of remittances, is thus
not confirmed by recent data.
After instrumenting for migration and remittances, the estimated effects
of having a migrant within the family become consistently large and positive
while the estimated effects of remittances are consistently large and negative
for the females and for the older males. Despite the insignificant results for
the females, the magnitudes and signs of the estimated coefficients imply that
the OLS estimates of the effect of migration are likely biased downwards while
the OLS estimates for the effect of remittances are biased upwards compared
to the true effects of these variables. This suggests negative endogeneity bias
between migration and labor supply and positive endogeneity bias between
remittances and labor supply.
Since the gaps in earnings and employment rates between Albania and its
EU neighbours continue to be large, the migration trends of recent years are
unlikely to reverse in the near future (Barjaba, 2000). The findings presented
in this paper are thus helpful for understanding some of the long-run implica-
tions of emigration for the Albanian economy.
Literature Review
Unlike other capital flows, such as foreign aid and FDI, remittances accrue
directly to the household budgets and are an important source of income in
migrant-sending regions (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). An increasing num-
ber of studies explore the economic consequences of migration through the
impact of migration and remittances on households’ decisions regarding la-
bor supply and productive investments. In order to provide a convincing es-
timate of the impact of migration and remittances, however, one must be able
3In the sample of male non-migrant household members that I use, the number of working
age males who live in households with migrants is less than one third the number of working age
males who live in households without migrants.
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to control for the selection of workers with different employment rates into the
migrant status as well as use exogenous variation in the remittance receipts.
In a study on Mexico, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) use the number
of Western Union (WU) offices per capita in the region to instrument for the
amount of remittances households receive. The number of Western Union of-
fices for the year preceding the survey is used to focus on the effects of the
predetermined, and thus exogenous, variation in remittances. The authors ex-
amine the effect of remittances on male and female employment patterns and
find that Mexican males do not decrease their labor supply in response to re-
ceived remittances but only reallocate their labor supply across types of em-
ployment, taking up more jobs in the informal sector. The results suggest that
Mexican males are likely compensating for the loss of a domestic earner in the
household, who has emigrated. In rural areas of Mexico, however, the number
of hours females work in the informal sector and in non-paid occupations is
found to decrease with the amount of remittances received.
A study on the Philippines by Yang (2008) also suggests that migration and
remittances affect the type of employment of the non-migrant household mem-
bers. Yang (2008) uses the appreciation of the currency of the migrant’s host
country against the Philippine peso during the 1997 Asian crisis as a source of
exogenous variation in the value of the remittance transfers. The results im-
ply that the total number of hours of child labor supplied by the households
decrease with more favorable exchange rate shocks while the total number of
hours worked in self-employment increase.
The uses and the impact of remittances are closely related to the incentives
for sending them. Lucas and Stark (1985) provide the first empirical study that
distinguishes and tests for the relevance of different motives behind migrants’
remitting behavior. The authors find that migrants remit more to those house-
holds that are in danger of income loss due to adverse weather conditions,
i.e., remittances are motivated at least partially by altruism on the side of the
migrants. Wealthier households also receive more remittances, which is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that egoistic motives are also present, as migrants
are attempting to defend their rights of inheritance and their position within
the household and the community upon return.4 Recently Rapoport and Doc-
quier (2006) provide a comprehensive survey of the existing literature on the
motivations to remit, which has established that migration is an implicit con-
tract among household members who ensure each other against income loss
by sending migrants abroad.
The literature on the motivation behind migrants’ remittances has led to
4This result could also stem from the effect of correlated unobservable “ability” characteristics
of migrant and non-migrant members within the same household.
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some recent hypotheses regarding the effect of migration and remittances on
the labor supply of those who stay behind. The large distance between mi-
grants and non-migrants implies that migration as an intra-familial insurance
mechanism is associated with high information and enforcement costs and
both migrants and non-migrants have an incentive to reduce their work effort.
As Chen (2006) points out, the difficulty to monitor the allocation of remit-
tances is largely neglected in the literature on the impact of migration. Chen
(2006) develops a model based on the assumption that in the presence of asym-
metric information, as is the case with the migration of a household member,
household decision making may not be fully cooperative. He suggests that
since it is difficult for the migrant to monitor the work effort of the spouse who
stays behind, a non-cooperative spouse, whose utility increases in the amount
of leisure she obtains, would reduce the time she works. Chen (2006) supports
his theoretical argument with an analysis of the China Health and Nutrition
Survey data. Among the empirical findings is that mothers work fewer hours
in both income-generating and household activities when the father migrates.
Although the reduction in the number of income-generating work hours may
be a result of the income effect of remittances, Chen (2006) attributes the to-
tal increase in mothers’ leisure to non-cooperative behavior on the part of the
spouse who stays behind and remains in charge of household expenditures
and resource allocation. A stance similar to that of Chen (2006) is taken by
Chami et al. (2003) whose findings from the analysis of macroeconomic data
are consistent with the hypothesis that remittances are transfers sent by altru-
istic migrants to compensate the non-migrant household members for adverse
economic outcomes. Chami et al. (2003) argue, however, that these transfers
might be used by the recipients to reduce job search effort, labor supply, and
might discourage labor market participation overall.
Azam and Gubert (2006) examine the possible disincentive effect of remit-
tances on work effort among agricultural households from the Kayes area in
western Mali. The authors observe that, on average, households with mi-
grants receive higher incomes per capita but their incomes from agricultural
and non-agricultural activities are lower compared to households without mi-
grants. Wealthier households also earn lower incomes while receiving more
remittances. This outcome might be due to positive selection on migrant sta-
tus. Nevertheless, Azam and Gubert (2006) conclude that migration in this
region of Africa resembles an implicit insurance system with opportunistic be-
havior on the part of the non-migrant household members whose work effort
cannot be perfectly monitored by the migrants. The conclusion is based on the
finding that households, for which the probability of receiving remittances is
higher, use their productive resources less efficiently compared to households
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without migrants and households that are less likely to receive remittances.
Unlike Yang (2008), the present analysis focuses on labor supply outcomes
on the individual rather than household level since male and female house-
hold members are likely to respond differently to migration and remittances.
This paper also builds on the previous study on Albania by Konica and Filer
(2009) who use survey data from 1996 and point to two offsetting effects of
remittances on labor force participation. On one hand, the opportunity costs
associated with the loss of domestic income earnings when a member of the
household emigrates may force those who remain at home to increase their la-
bor supply in order to compensate for that loss. On the other hand, if leisure
is a normal good, the household members may respond to the income effect
of higher household income from remittances by reducing their labor sup-
ply. Konica and Filer (2009) find that neither the existence of emigrants in
the household nor the amount of remittances received has an effect on the
labor force participation of Albanian males. Among Albanian females, how-
ever, higher remittance incomes are associated with lower probability of labor
force participation. The findings of Konica and Filer (2009) also suggest that
migrants’ higher earnings abroad contribute to the development of household-
owned businesses in Albania. In particular, members of households with re-
turned migrants in Albania are more likely to be employed in a household
business.
While the findings of Konica and Filer (2009) are representative of several
studies suggesting that the negative effect of remittances on female labor force
participation is a response to higher incomes from abroad, the direction of
causality between migration, remittances and labor supply remains to be es-
tablished. It is unclear whether the migration decision as well as the decision
to send remittances is not, in fact, influenced by lack of employment opportu-
nities at home.
There are to-date only two empirical studies on the impact of migration in
Albania, which recognize the importance of the exogeneity of the migration re-
gressor and use instrumental variable techniques. In the first study McCarthy
et al. (2006) analyze the impact of international migration on the agricultural
sector. The authors find that the greater the number of household members
abroad, the less agricultural labor those who stay behind supply. Nevertheless,
the additional source of capital from remittances relieves financial constraints
and allows the migrants’ households to invest and receive higher agricultural
and total incomes. The proportion of the male population aged 20 to 39 in the
region is one of the variables used by McCarthy et al. (2006) to instrument for
the number of household members abroad. The variable is computed from
the 2001 Population Census and its variation is likely a result of the intensity
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of prior migration from the region. Since the majority of Albanian emigrants
are males in that age group, a lower proportion would imply higher migration
intensity until 2001 and thus, better access to migrant networks and lower in-
formation costs for potential migrants from the particular region. While the
variable is likely correlated with the household migration decision, its corre-
lation with household decisions regarding agricultural production is unlikely.
As additional instruments McCarthy et al. (2006) use the density of cars within
the region as a proxy of the costs of accessing migration networks and the re-
gional unemployment rate as a proxy for the local non-agricultural income-
generating opportunities and opportunity costs of emigrating. At the house-
hold level the authors use the household’s relative wealth position with respect
to the neighboring reference population and the length of time at the current
residence, both variables being potential push factors for migration.5
The second study on Albania that uses instrumental variable strategies to
estimate the impact of migration is by Kilic et al. (2007). The rich survey dataset
used in their study, as well as in this study—the Albania 2005 Living Standards
Measurement Survey—provides most of the variables used to instrument for
the total length of migration. The instruments used include whether a house-
hold member in 1990 spoke either Greek or Italian, whether the head of the
household or the head’s spouse had any relative or friend living abroad in
1990, the distance in kilometers between the household’s place of residence
and the closest major point of exit from Albania, the annual average number of
economic and labor market shocks experienced by the household, and whether
the household owned a satellite dish in 1990. The authors find a positive effect
of the length of the period spent abroad on the probability of the household
investing in its own non-farm business upon the migrant’s return.
In this paper I revisit the labor supply question of those left behind, con-
sidering the theoretical arguments and the empirical findings of other stud-
ies on the impact of migration and remittances. Given the long-term nature
of migration and remittances, I look for recent evidence of their impact in
Albania and compare the results with the previous findings by Konica and
Filer (2009). In addition, I use an instrumental variable approach, similar to
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), Kilic et al. (2007), and McCarthy et al.
(2006), in order to deal with the potential endogeneity of migration and re-
mittance receipts.
5According to Stark and Taylor (1989), the relatively poor households have stronger incentives
to send members abroad as that would improve their relative wealth position within the neigh-
bourhood; Longer-time residents are likely to have stronger relationships with the households
from the surrounding area and thus lower information costs with regards to existing migration
opportunities.
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Data and Variable Definitions
The primary dataset used in this study is the Albania 2005 Living Standards
Measurement Survey (Albania 2005 LSMS). The survey was conducted during
the period May-July 2005 by the Living Standards unit of the Albania Institute
of Statistics (INSTAT) with the technical assistance of the World Bank.6 The
total sample consists of 3,640 households. The survey collects information on
each member of the selected households. After excluding the household mem-
bers who have not been able to perform employment-related activities due to
disability or chronic illness, I attain a final sample of 4,367 male and 4,717 fe-
male non-migrant household members of working age (15-55 for females and
15-60 for males).7
The survey results appear consistent with the aggregate data from other
sources presented in Figures 2.1 and 2.3. The respondents report a total of
5,346 male and 1,556 female household members of all ages who live abroad.
The male migrants are primarily between the age of 20 and 42, and the female
migrants are mostly between the age of 25 and 40. This implies that a con-
siderable part of the Albanian labor force finds employment outside Albania.
More than one third of the interviewed households have at least one migrant.
Sixty-four percent of the households with migrants receive remittances from
abroad. A small percentage of the households without migrants (10%) also re-
ceive remittances from relatives who are not members of the household.8 For
those households with migrants (and which do receive remittances), the av-
erage amount received per month per adult household member (15 years old
and above) is 114 Euros (147 US dollars) and for those households which do
not have migrants but do receive remittances, the average monthly remittance
receipts per adult are 22 Euros (28 US dollars).9 According to the survey results
most of the remitting individuals are males between 22 and 30 years old who
are either heads of households or sons of the household head and his spouse.
Four to five times more males than females are reported to have sent remit-
6The data and all related documentation is available for download from the World Bank LSMS
website: http://go.worldbank.org/IPLXWMCNJ0.
7According to the survey classification, all persons alive who have lived in Albania and in the
respective household for at least one month during the preceding year and all guests whose stay
with the household exceeds six months are considered present household members. Among those
there are 180 individuals who report employment abroad during the week prior to the survey. I
consider these household members to be migrants and exclude them from the sample on which I
perform my analysis.
8Migrant family members who lived less than one month in Albania and in their respective
household are not considered members of that household.
9Since the majority of the Albanian migrants work in Greece and in Italy, for the most part the
respondents report the amount of remittances they have received in Euros, therefore I measure
incomes in Euros and not in US dollars. In order to convert the incomes which are not reported in
Euros, I use the historical exchange rates from May 1, 2005 obtained from http://www.oanda.
com/convert/fxhistory.
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tances from abroad during the year preceding the date of the survey. Table
2.2 is a summary of the characteristics of the two types of households—those
which have members abroad and those which do not.
In my subsequent analysis I focus on estimating the effect of the following
two dichotomous variables—whether the household has at least one house-
hold member (previous or current) who lives abroad and whether the house-
hold has received remittances from abroad during the year preceding the sur-
vey date. Although the variation in the actual amount of remittances appears
sufficient to account for variation in the dependent variable, a major concern
with using the actual amount of remittance income is the very high probability
of measurement error. Exact income from remittances for one year prior to the
survey date can easily be mismeasured, leading to biased estimates of the coef-
ficients and their standard errors. With a dichotomous variable for remittances,
however, the measurement error is likely zero.10 In Table 2.1 the households are
split into four groups depending on whether they have a household member
living abroad and/or received remittances. The table also shows the average
number of adult household members (as a percentage of all adult household
members) who have reported work of any kind for each household group. It is
evident that the households that do not have members abroad and do not re-
ceive remittances also have the highest percentage of working adult members.
In order to draw a comparison with the observations made in earlier stud-
ies, I compare the incomes of the households with and without migrants. The
Albanian households that do not have migrants abroad appear relatively poorer
despite earning higher incomes domestically, compared to the households with
migrants. I estimate the kernel densities of the total monthly income per adult
household member both including remittances and excluding remittances for
the two types of households (Figure 2.4). I also perform Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(K-S) tests and reject the hypotheses that the monthly income per adult mem-
ber excluding remittances and the monthly income per adult member includ-
ing remittances have equal distributions for the two types of households.11
In addition, I perform t-tests for equality of the average incomes. When re-
mittances from abroad are included, the average monthly incomes per adult
household member in the two types of households are not significantly differ-
ent. However, when remittances are excluded, the t-test confirms the result
10The more recent literature on migration acknowledges the tendency of underreporting remit-
tances in household survey data. Grigorian et al. (2008) provide a detailed discussion of the issue
as well as evidence of systematic underreporting of remittances in survey data from Armenia. Ko-
rovilas (1999) attempts to correct for underreporting of remittances in Albania and finds that the
total remittance inflows to Albania in the early 1990s exceed the official statistics by approximately
75 percent.
11The respective combined K-S D statistics are 0.200 and 0.073. Both hypotheses are rejected at
p > 0.99.
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that the average monthly income per adult is lower in the households with-
out migrants (see Table 2.2). To some extent the results of the Albania 2005
LSMS are in line with the observations for western Mali reported by Azam and
Gubert (2006).
The dependent variable of interest is whether the household member has
worked or not during the seven-day period preceding the survey interview. All
individuals employed by a non-household member, paid workers in a house-
hold business, employers, self-employed, and unpaid workers on household
farms are all considered working. This definition avoids the problem of un-
registered employment, a wide-spread phenomenon in Albania, especially in
the rural areas. In fact, 31.6 percent of the household members in the sample
report unpaid work in household farms, 22.6 percent are employers or self-
employed and only 45.8 percent are employed by a non-household member or
are employed by and receive payment from a member of the household.12
Finally, I include the following variables as exogenous regressors: age, age
squared, the highest level of education completed (secondary or university),
place of residence (Tirana or other urban area), presence in the household of
one or more children who are younger than six years, the amount of other
non-labor income, and the regional (prefecture) unemployment rate in 2005 re-
ported by INSTAT. The non-labor income explanatory variable is the sum of all
non-labor income, excluding remittances from abroad, received by the house-
hold in the preceding twelve months. It includes gifts from relatives and other
persons and institutions in Albania, rental income, revenue from the sale of as-
sets, inheritance, and lottery or gambling winnings. A person with a secondary
education has completed either a general or a vocational secondary school. In-
dividuals with university education are those who have completed a univer-
sity or a post-graduate degree in Albania or abroad. In order to control for
regional factors affecting the probability of a person being employed, I include
the unemployment rate in 2005 for the respective administrative region (pre-
fecture) as an explanatory variable. Albania is divided into twelve prefectures
with an average number of economically active population of 90,447 accord-
ing to data from INSTAT. Each prefecture has experienced different levels of
unemployment and emigration and remittance flows over time. Finally, Table
2.2 contains the splits by place of residence for the migrant and non-migrant
households. Households with and households without migrants appear al-
most equally likely to reside in both the rural and the urban areas of the coun-
try. However, fewer of the households with migrants (15%) live in the capital
12This is a strong indication that the official unemployment rates in Albania are likely mislead-
ing, confirming claims by sources other than the Albanian Institute of Statistics.
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Tirana, compared to the households without migrants (19%).13
Estimation and Results
I investigate the effect of migration and remittances on labor supply in Albania,
i.e., I attempt to determine whether having a migrant abroad and/or receiving
remittances affects the decision to work of those household members who re-
main in Albania. This formal analysis that extends beyond a mere comparison
of descriptive statistics aims to detect whether migration and/or remittances
received imply different labor supply decisions for the migrant families, con-
trolling for a number of household and individual characteristics.
A Linear Probability Model (LPM) is estimated for the probability of a
household member to be working on the subsamples of male and female house-
hold members separately. Eighty-four percent of the male household members
who live abroad are between the age of 20 and 45. This implies that the male
migrants fall into the same age group as the male household members who
are the most likely to be employed in Albania as well. To avoid the implied
sample selection problem, in addition to the pooled subsamples of all working
age males and all working age females, the analysis is also performed sepa-
rately only for the males within the 46-60 age group. I also analyze separately
only the married female household members, as their labor supply behavior is
likely to differ from the labor supply behavior of the single females.14
For each subsample I estimate the following equation:
Yi = a0 + a1Mi + a2Ri + a3Xi + εi (2.1)
Yi = 1[Y
∗ > 0] (2.2)
εi ∼ Normal(0, σ2) (2.3)
where Y is a binary dependent variable denoting employment, M is a binary
variable for the presence of at least one migrant household member, R is a
binary variable for remittance income and X is a vector of exogenous individ-
ual and household characteristics, which likely affect individual labor supply,
such as age, education, place of residence, presence of young children, other
13This may be explained by the fact that since the fall of communism Tirana has also been a sub-
stantial recipient of internal migrants from Albania. Among the working age Tirana residents in
the sample, 56.6% had previously lived in another municipality. The majority of these individuals
(91.6%) have moved to Tirana between 1989 and 2005. Such peak in internal migration towards
other urban areas in Albania is not observed in the data. With relatively better employment oppor-
tunities compared to the rest of the country, Tirana may be considered an “affordable” alternative
to international migration by some Albanian households.
14I add the few instances of individuals who cohabit with their partner to the subsample of the
married individuals.
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non-labor income, and the regional unemployment rate.
The results of the OLS estimation for all four groups of individuals are pre-
sented in Table 2.3.15 The OLS coefficients for having a migrant are small and
statistically insignificant for all subsamples. The coefficient for remittance re-
ceipts is significant at the 5% level and negative only for the pooled subsample
of all working age male household members.16 Thus, the findings on the ef-
fect of remittances differ considerably from the findings of Konica and Filer
(2009).17 The difference in the results I obtain and the results in Konica and
Filer (2009) may be attributed to either an overall change in the labor supply
behavior among the Albanian population since 1996 or to different preferences
of those individuals who remained in Albania until 2005.
The LPM results presented in Table 2.3 also suggest that a university degree
is associated with a large increase in the probability that a household member
is working, particularly for Albanian females, for whom the OLS coefficients
for university education are significant at the 1% level and more than twice
greater than those for males. The coefficients for age have the expected signs
as well as the coefficients for the presence of young children, which are statis-
tically significant only for the subsamples of the female household members.
Higher non-labor incomes, other than remittances, through an income effect,
imply lower probability of working for male household members, while the
relatively more abundant opportunities for informal work in the agricultural
sector in rural areas can explain the negative signs of the coefficients for ur-
ban and Tirana residence. The variable for the regional unemployment rate is
based on official INSTAT data. As stressed above, the official data might not
be correctly representing the actual employment conditions in each region and
the signs and the statistical significance for the predicted effects of the regional
unemployment rate should be interpreted in that light.
One of the assumptions for unbiased and consistent OLS coefficients in the
estimation of (2.1) is that all regressors on the right hand-side of (2.1) are ex-
ogenous. Identifying the causal effects of migration and remittances, however,
is problematic due to the possible correlation of these variables with the error
15Due to distributional concerns, besides LPM, I also estimate a Probit model on the data. The
predicted marginal effects I obtain from the non-linear estimation are equivalent to the reported
results from the LPM estimation. I also initially divided the subsample of single females into age
groups but this did not lead to results substantially different from the ones presented in Table 2.3.
16Instead of regressing separately on migration and remittances, I also performed the analysis
with only one interaction term for both variables. This did not alter the results reported in Table
2.3. I obtained small and statistically insignificant OLS coefficients for all subsamples except for
the subsample of all males, for which the estimated OLS coefficient was -0.044 with a standard
error of 0.02 (significant at the 1% level).
17As Konica and Filer (2009) do, instead of treating R as a binary variable, I also perform the
analysis using the actual value of the remittances received, including the value of in-kind remit-
tances and excluding the value of in-kind remittances. All estimated coefficients for remittances
are close to zero.
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term ε. Since migrant status and remittances cannot be expected to be ran-
domly allocated across households and decisions on migration, remittances,
and labor supply are likely made simultaneously, endogeneity between migra-
tion and remittances and the outcome of interest is a major methodological
concern that plagues migration research.
For each household in the data, the factors which “explain” whether some
household members work abroad and whether remittances are received may
also be related to the household members’ decision to participate in the labor
force. Moreover, many of the factors and characteristics which influence these
decisions are unobservable (e.g., ability, motivation, or risk aversion). In other
words, if ability and motivation influence both the decision to send a migrant
abroad and subsequently whether remittances are received, and the labor sup-
ply outcomes for the non-migrant household members, ability and motivation
(which are both unobservable) will end up as a part of the error term which
will become correlated with both migration and remittance receipts. More able
and more motivated households could be more willing to send migrants (and
also receive higher incomes in Albania that would in turn allow them to do
so). The migrants from those households could also be earning higher incomes
abroad and thus would be more likely to send remittances back home. The
more able and highly motivated could also be more likely to be employed or re-
ceive higher incomes at home and therefore, not need to send migrants abroad.
Alternatively, households with members who experience long unemployment
spells might be more likely to send members abroad in order to compensate
for lower domestic incomes. The potential reversed causality, in addition to
the unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias, would imply that the
OLS estimates in (2.1) are inconsistent. Dealing with this problem calls for an
estimation approach that involves instrumental variables.
By finding an instrumental variable that is correlated with migration or re-
mittances but is not correlated with ability and motivation, one can use only the
variation in the size of remittances, which is uncorrelated with the error term,
i.e., the instruments should not affect the labor supply decision of the house-
hold members other than through their effect on the migration decision and
remittance incomes. For instance, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) analyze
the impact of remittances on employment patterns in Mexico by instrumenting
for the amount of remittances with the number of WU agents per capita in each
state in Mexico. The number of WU offices during the year preceding their sur-
vey data is used in order to avoid possible endogeneity through simultaneous
determination of the amount of remittances households receive and their la-
bor supply decisions. The instrument is also interacted with the percentages of
household members with secondary and higher education to allow for house-
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hold level variation. F-tests are performed to ensure that the instrument and
its interactions are jointly significant in explaining monthly remittance incomes
per household member. At the same time, the joint exogeneity of the instru-
ment and its interactions with respect to labor supply is tested by including
the error term from an equation predicting the amount of remittances into the
labor supply equation and testing its significance (with and F-test).
The instrument which Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) use in their study
on Mexico is likely to be appropriate in the case of Albania as well. Forty
percent of the transfers to Albania take place through money transfer compa-
nies and only a limited share through banks (World Bank, 2006). According
to the World Bank report (2006), the role of commercial banks in remittance
payments from Italy to Albania, for instance, is limited not only by the higher
costs per transaction, but also by the small number of ATMs. In 2005, thanks
to relatively lower transaction costs and the large number of agents across the
country, WU dominated the formal market for money transfers to Albania. In
fact, WU conducted almost eighty percent of all money transfer transactions
through financial institutions from Italy to Albania (World Bank, 2006).18 It can
be argued that regions with higher density of WU agents also enjoy larger re-
mittance flows and the households in those regions are more likely to receive
remittances from abroad.
Similar to Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006), I consider the number of WU
agents per capita within a prefecture in Albania as one of the instrumental vari-
ables that can be used to predict remittance receipts. I construct an instrument
based on the contact information of each WU agent in Albania in 2003-2004.
As already emphasized above, the years 2003-2004 year are important (as op-
posed to 2005 when the survey was conducted) as it is likely that the number
of WU offices in 2005 affects the labor supply decision of the household mem-
bers in the sample, while the number of WU offices from the previous year is
likely to be correlated only with whether the household receives remittances
but not with the labor supply decisions of its members. Brief phone interviews
were held with some of the WU agents where it could not be determined from
the information in the telephone directory from 2003-2004 whether a particu-
lar WU agent had been in existence in 2004. For the purpose of comparing
the results, I also attempted to instrument for the amount of remittances per
adult household member, rather than for whether remittances are received.
However, finding an instrument that would predict the amount of remittances
proved to be an unattainable task.19
18MoneyGram started to provide money transfer services to Albania only in 2004 and the first
ATM in Albania was established in 2004 (World Bank, 2006).
19Mapping the standard deviations of the remittance incomes and the incomes from other
sources, conditional on the exogenous variables included in X, reveals a relatively high variation
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In addition to the number of WU agents which Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo
(2006) use to instrument for remittances, I consider the instruments for migra-
tion used in the previous studies on Albanian migration by Kilic et al. (2007)
and McCarthy et al. (2006), discussed in Section 2, as potential candidates for
instruments for my analysis. I end up with a set of five instrumental variables
which I use to identify and estimate the effects of migration and remittances
in (2.1): the number of WU agents per capita in 2003-2004, ownership of a
satellite dish in 1990, knowledge of Greek or Italian by a previous or a current
household member in 1990 (including the migrant members), a proxy for the
proximity to a migration network (a friend or a relative residing abroad) in
1990, and the male-to-female ratio for the population aged between 20 to 39
within a district. All these are likely to fulfil the criteria for a valid instrument,
i.e., while they are likely to have influenced the migration strategy and remit-
tance incomes of a household, they are not likely to be correlated with the labor
supply outcomes of the household’s members in 2005. Greece and Italy are the
major destinations for Albanian migrants and the ownership of a satellite dish
is believed to have facilitated the mastering of Greek and Italian by the Alba-
nians during the communist period and the early years of economic transition
(Barjaba, 2000; Kilic et al., 2007). Knowledge of the language of the destination
country can reduce the costs of migration as well as improve the migrant’s abil-
ity to send remittances back home. Having families and friends who have been
or are still abroad, as well as residing in a region where a larger part of the pop-
ulation has emigrated implies proximity to migrant networks and lower cost
of emigration as well. Table 2.2 provides the means and standard deviations
for the five instruments for households with migrants and households without
migrants. I also report the results of the tests I perform to confirm the relevance
of the instruments for the four sub-samples analyzed in Table 2.4. The F-tests
confirm that the instruments are jointly significant in explaining the two poten-
tially endogenous variables. I test for the validity of over-identification with a
Hansen-Sargan test and also by testing for the significance of the predicted
residual from the remittances and migration regressions in the labor supply
equation. The results of both tests for the subsamples of all non-migrant fe-
males, the non-migrant married females only, as well as the older non-migrant
males, confirm that the instruments I use are correctly excluded from the labor
supply equation; therefore, I focus on the results for these three subsamples.
Despite its limitations, due to predictions ranging outside the (0,1) interval,
the LPM is used in the literature when it is necessary to estimate effects of bi-
in remittances. However, as mentioned in the previous section, by using a dichotomous variable
for remittance receipts, instead of the self-reported amount of remittances received, one can avoid
the biases associated with a measurement error that is highly probable in this setting.
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nary endogenous regressors on a binary outcome. The issue of using LPM in
such cases has been addressed in Heckman and MaCurdy (1985) and in An-
grist (2001). Heckman and MaCurdy (1985) show that in the case of simultane-
ous LPMs, the instrumental variable technique results in consistent coefficient
estimates and therefore is a valid procedure. According to Angrist (2001), a
linear causal model estimated by 2SLS gives similar average effects to a probit
or a logit model and is generally safer as the estimates obtained are consistent,
whether or not the first stage conditional expectation function is linear. Angrist
(2001) argues that for dichotomous dependent variables, if one aims to estimate
the causal effects on the outcome of interest—rather than structural parameters
of latent variables model—a linear model is as appropriate as a non-linear one.
In those cases the LPM has the advantage over non-linear models of allowing
direct comparisons of the estimates of the two-stage and the single-stage pro-
cedures. Furthermore, in the case of discrete covariates, OLS estimates with
robust standard errors are appropriate (Wooldridge, 2001).
The results of the 2SLS estimations for the four subsamples are presented
in Table 2.3.20 When an instrumental variable approach is used to correct for
the possible endogeneity of migration and remittances, the predicted effects of
both remittances and migration on the labor supply outcomes of the Albanian
working age male and female household members, as well as for the subsam-
ple of married females only, appear to be statistically insignificant. However,
the coefficients for migration and remittances for the subsample of working
age males above 45 become statistically significant at the 5% level compared to
the respective OLS estimates.21
It is noteworthy that among all males of working age, males above 45 are
the most likely to remain in Albania. This implies that for this subsample “all”
individuals are observed and not just the ones who decide not to migrate and
it is less likely that the household members who are left behind have differ-
ent characteristics from those who migrate simply because very few choose to
do so. The positive and significant coefficient for having a migrant within the
family and the negative and significant coefficient for receiving remittances are
in line with the predictions of the standard neoclassical theory of individual la-
bor supply—the results imply that older male household members respond
to the loss of domestic workers by engaging in labor activities, including non-
20For the estimations with robust standard errors, I use the ivreg2 procedure in Stata (Baum et al.,
2002). The procedure also computes the Hansen’s J-statistic reported in Table 2.4. As a robustness
check I also estimate saturated models for the LPMs estimated and presented in this paper. The
results from the saturated models are sufficiently close to the ones presented in this paper, which
further justifies the choice of a LPM as an estimation technique.
21The 2SLS coefficient (-0.276 with a standard error of 0.10) for one interaction term in place of
the two endogenous variables in the sample of all females is also statistically significant at the 5%
level.
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paid work, while remittance incomes increase their reservation wages and con-
sumption of leisure.
In addition, after instrumenting, for females and for older males I obtain
large and positive coefficients for having a migrant and large and negative co-
efficients for receiving remittances. Despite the insignificant coefficients for the
subsamples of all females and only the married females, the magnitudes and
the signs of all estimated coefficients for migration and remittances suggest
that the OLS estimates of the effect of migration are likely biased downwards,
while the OLS estimates for the effect of remittances are biased upwards, com-
pared to the true effects of these variables, i.e., there is a negative endogeneity
bias between migration and labor supply and a positive endogeneity bias be-
tween remittances and labor supply when assumed that migration and remit-
tances are exogenous.
The predicted combined effects of migration and remittances for all four
samples are presented in Table 2.5. For 46-60 year old males, in particular,
the estimated effects imply a combined positive endogeneity bias of migration
and remittances and the combined effect of a 26 percent reduction in the prob-
ability of working if a household has migrants and receives remittances. In
addition to using all five instruments, I perform the above estimations with
different combinations of instruments. For the subsample of males aged 46-60,
for instance, estimations involving different combinations of instruments lead
to changes in the magnitude of the coefficients that imply a predicted com-
bined effect of 20 to 50 percent reduction in the probability of working if a
household has migrants and receives remittances. Although the effects cannot
be estimated more precisely, when the two relatively weaker instruments for
remittances are dropped—the number of WU agents and the proxy for migra-
tion network in 1990—the F-statistics from the F-tests for joint significance in
explaining migration and remittances exceed the critical values provided by
Stock and Yogo (2002) for two endogenous regressors and three instruments,
confirming that the results are relatively insensitive to the particular combina-
tion of instruments employed.22
As a robustness check, in addition to performing the analysis with differ-
ent sets of instrumental variables, I use migration and remittances separately
as sole endogenous regressors. The estimated effects for both migration and
remittances are large, negative, and insignificant for the two female subsam-
ples, small, positive, and insignificant for the subsample of working age males.
22I also estimate just identified models using only the two strongest instruments—a dummy
variable for whether a household member spoke Greek or Italian in 1990 and the ratio of males
aged 20-39. The coefficients for migration and remittances are insignificant for all subsamples
except for the subsample of older males. For the older males I obtain coefficients for migration and
remittances which are slightly larger in magnitude than the ones presented in Table 2.3.
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For the 46-60 year old males I obtain a positive coefficient for migration and
a negative coefficient for remittances (although of much smaller magnitudes
compared to the estimates obtained when both regressors are included).23
Conclusion
In this paper I use recent household survey data from Albania to estimate the
effects of migration and remittances on the labor supply outcomes of the Alba-
nian non-migrants. Given the long-term nature of the migration phenomenon
in Albania, I compare my results with the previous findings on Albania by
Konica and Filer (2009). In addition, I use an instrumental variable approach to
deal with the potential endogeneity of migration and remittance receipts. As-
suming that migration and remittances are exogenous, I find no significant ef-
fect of having a household member abroad on the probability that a household
member who still lives in Albania works. With respect to remittance receipts,
however, unlike in earlier findings, I find no significant effect on the proba-
bility of working for females, and a small, negative, and significant effect for
males. When an instrumental variable approach is used, the predicted effects
of migration and remittances on labor supply appear significant only for males
between the ages of 46 and 60, with a combined effect of 20 to 50 percent re-
duction in the probability of working if a household has migrants and receives
remittances. The expected negative impact on unemployment due to an in-
come effect of remittances among the female population in Albania is thus not
confirmed by the recent data. However, after instrumenting, I obtain large and
positive coefficients for having a migrant and large and negative coefficients
for receiving remittances for the subsamples of females and older males. De-
spite the insignificant coefficients for migration and remittances for the female
subsamples, the magnitudes and the signs of all estimated coefficients suggest
that the OLS estimates of the effect of migration are likely biased downwards,
while the OLS estimates for the effect of remittances are biased upwards, com-
pared to the true effects of these variables. Since the emigration trends from
Albania are unlikely to reverse in the near future, the findings presented in
this paper are helpful for understanding some of the long-run implications of
emigration for the Albanian economy.
23Results are available upon request.
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Figure 2.1: Migrant Stock as Percentage of the Population and Remittances as
Percentage of GDP
Country Migrant Stock (2005)Remittances (2006)
Albania 27.5 14.9 27.50% 14.90%
Bulgaria 12.1 5.4 12.10% 5.40%
Croatia 16 2.9 16.00% 2.90%
Macedonia18.2 4.3 18.20% 4.30%
Romania 5.7 5.5 5.70% 5.50%
Serbia & Montenegro21.9 13.8 21.90% 13.80%
Turkey 6 0.3 6.00% 0.30%
Ukraine 13.1 0.8 13.10% 0.80%
Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008 














Figure 2.2: Workers’ Remittances as Share of GDP, Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI), and Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Official Aid (OA):
Five-year Moving Averages
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Table 2.1: Number of Households and Percentage of Adult Household
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Percentage of total 66.43 33.57 -
Received remittances 0.10 0.64 -41.532
(0.01) (0.01) **
Monthly remittance income 2.17 73.08 -3.346
per adult HH member (Euro) (0.44) (29.83) **
Monthly income per adult HH 90.53 58.46 9.796
member excluding remittances (Euro) (2.13) (1.86) **
Monthly income per adult HH 92.70 131.57 -1.809
member including remittances (Euro) (2.20) (29.94)
Urban residence 0.37 0.37 -0.104
(0.01) (0.01)
Rural residence 0.44 0.47 -1.794
(0.01) (0.01)
Tirana residence 0.19 0.15 2.478
(0.01) (0.01) *
Satellite dish ownership in 1990 0.01 0.03 -3.947
(0.00) (0.01) **
Migrant network in 1990 0.07 0.08 -0.223
(0.01) (0.01)
Ratio of males to females (20-39) 49.11 48.71 5.67
(0.04) (0.06) **
HH member spoke Greek or Italian 0.09 0.21 -10.695
in 1990 (0.01) (0.01) **
Number of WU agents 0.53 0.53 -0.695
(0.00) (0.00)
Number of Households 2,418 1,222
Note: (i) Standard errors in parentheses; (ii) **,* Denote significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively; (iii) Households with migrants are those households which have 
at least one member living/working abroad; (iv) The income variables are per present 
household member above the age of 14; remittances refer only to remittances from 
abroad received by the household members throughout the year preceding the 
survey.
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Table 2.3: Labor Supply of Albanian Females (Aged 15-55) and Albanian Males (Aged 15-60)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Migrant(s) -0.009 0.226 -0.020 0.638 -0.009 0.000 0.006 0.552**
(0.02) (0.32) (0.02) (0.40) (0.02) (0.16) (0.03) (0.23)
Remittances 0.029 -0.644 0.034 -1.026* -0.041** 0.101 -0.051* -0.813**
(0.02) (0.47) (0.02) (0.60) (0.02) (0.29) (0.03) (0.36)
Age 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.061*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.037 -0.011
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.09)
Age squared/100 -0.064*** -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.077** -0.092*** -0.097*** -0.048 -0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.09)
Secondary education 0.065*** 0.062*** 0.112*** 0.119*** 0.041** 0.041** 0.058** 0.049
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
University education 0.459*** 0.441*** 0.471*** 0.488*** 0.181*** 0.192*** 0.170*** 0.092
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Urban residence -0.290*** -0.307*** -0.292*** -0.308*** -0.175*** -0.170*** -0.145*** -0.159***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Tirana residence -0.317*** -0.264*** -0.330*** -0.252*** -0.125*** -0.133*** -0.147*** -0.085
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Child (0-6) -0.074*** -0.099*** -0.097*** -0.118*** 0.024 0.031* -0.076* -0.085
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Non-labor income (Euro)/100 -0.003 0.001 -0.014 -0.005 -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.090*** -0.076**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Regional unemployment rate/100 -0.397*** 0.091 -0.341** 0.366 -0.161** -0.263 -0.169 0.261
(0.09) (0.33) (0.11) (0.42) (0.08) (0.20) (0.15) (0.27)
Constant -0.327*** -0.231** -0.278* -0.457 -0.793*** -0.848*** 0.301 1.668
(0.06) (0.11) (0.14) (0.31) (0.05) (0.07) (1.85) (2.39)
N
Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are in parentheses; (ii) ***, **, *, Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; (iii) The key variables, Migration and Remittances, 
are dichotomous, where one indicates that the household has at least one current or previous household member residing abroad and that the household has received remittances 
from abroad during the year prior to the survey date; (iv) The identifying instruments used are whether any of the members of the household, including the current migrants, spoke 
either Greek or Italian in 1990, whether the household owned a satellite dish in 1990, a proxy for the existence of a migrant network in 1990, the ratio of males to females in the 20-39 
age group per prefecture, and the number of WU offices per capita per prefecture; (v) The first stage contains all exogenous variables included in the main equation.
All Females Married All Males Males (46-60)
4,717 3,032 4,367 1,264
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Satellite dish ownership 0.119* 0.143** 0.110* 0.147*
in 1990 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
HH member spoke Greek 0.257*** 0.285*** 0.288*** 0.297***
or Italian in 1990 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.40)
Migrant network in 1990 -0.047 -0.042 -0.056* -0.075
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
Ratio of males aged 20-39 -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.028***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of WU agents -0.078 -0.043 -0.103 -0.067
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16)
Satellite dish ownership 0.051 0.011 -0.024 0.044
in 1990 (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09)
HH member spoke Greek 0.190*** 0.212*** 0.158*** 0.218***
or Italian in 1990 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Migrant network in 1990 0.031 0.013 0.043 0.058
(0.03) (0.32) (0.03) (0.05)
Ratio of males aged 20-39 -0.012** -0.008* -0.008* -0.010
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of WU agents -0.029 -0.008 -0.027 -0.088
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17)










Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000










Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000










Prob>F 0.303 0.964 0.031 0.213










Prob>F 0.051 0.205 0.002 0.069
Hansen-Sargan test 4.421 2.050 16.601 3.370
Chi-sq(3) P-value 0.220 0.562 0.001 0.338
N 4,717 3,032 4,367 1,264
Migrant(s)
Remittances
Notes: (i) Robust standard errors are in parentheses; (ii) ***, **, *, Denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively; (iii) The first stage contains all exogenous 
variables included in the main equation, only the estimated coefficients of the 
identifying instruments are reported. 
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Table 2.5: Summary of the Effects of Migration and Remittances on whether a
Household Member in Albania Works









































































The unique opening up of the previously closed post-communist society in Albania is
utilized to investigate the motivations for and impacts of emigration across geograph-
ically close but economically diverse borders. As would be anticipated, labor flows
were very large across all segments of society. There is, however, extensive evidence
that these flows may have significantly improved the lives of those who remained be-
hind. The consequences of Albania’s accession and those of similarly affected countries
in the European Union are discussed.
JEL Codes: P2, J61, R23
Keywords: International Migration, Remittances, Albania, EU Enlargement, Labor Mar-
kets
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Documenting the Importance Chapter 3
Documenting the Importance
The Albanian economy has some of the highest migration and remittance flows
among the major post-communist economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
According to recent estimates, in 2005, Albania ranked fourth in the world in
emigrants as a percentage of the population, with almost one third of Albani-
ans (27.5 percent) living abroad (World Bank, 2008). At the same time, remit-
tance flows have consistently amounted to a large share of the country’s GDP,
exceeding by several fold both net foreign investment and the amount of de-
velopment aid received by Albania. In 2006, for example, recorded remittances
(generally admitted to be only a fraction of the total) amounted to 13 percent of
GDP and almost 4 times either FDI or Development Assistance (World Bank,
2008).
Push and Pull Factors
Mass emigration and poverty go hand in hand in Albania. Heavy reliance on
agriculture1 combined with a high level of land fragmentation, especially in ru-
ral areas, has induced many Albanians to search for employment abroad since
the end of communism. The beginning of the economic transition in Albania
was also marred by high inflation rates reaching 350 percent at the end of 1990,
and high unemployment due to the restructuring of the public sector and the
inability of the Albanian economy, and especially its private sector, to grow
fast enough to provide jobs for the relatively young Albanian population (19.5
percent of the Albanian population in 1989 was between the ages of 15 and 24)
(Barjaba, 2000). In addition to poverty and high unemployment rates, the lack
of basic services and infrastructure, such as running water and electricity, is
a strong push factor creating mass emigration from post-communist Albania
(Carletto et al., 2005; Stampini et al., 2008).
Short-term migration of a household member, mostly to neighboring Greece
and lasting between days and months, has become a common strategy for
many Albanian households to make ends meet (Carletto et al., 2006). Apart
from being a means of simple survival, emigration of a household member is
often perceived to make the difference between being poor and being relatively
prosperous (De Soto et al., 2002).
Albania’s unemployment rate is significantly higher than that of neighbor-
ing European Union members Greece and Italy, while the per capita income
is approximately ninety percent lower than in those countries (De Soto et al.,
1More than half of the Albanian population still works in the agricultural sector (King and
Vullnetari, 2003).
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2002). In addition to considerable gaps in earnings and unemployment be-
tween Albania and its two EU neighbors, exposure during the communist pe-
riod is an important pull factor for the migrants from Albania (Barjaba, 2000;
Carletto et al., 2006). Many Albanians in the south of the country have historic
ties to Greece and speak Greek at home. Exposure to Italian television en-
abled Albanians, especially the younger portion of the population, to become
familiar with both the Italian language and mass culture, eradicating language
barriers and portraying an attractive life style abroad. As a result, almost one
half of the children who have left the home of their parents since 1990 had lived
abroad by 2002, primarily in Greece and in Italy (Carletto et al., 2006).
Patterns and Outliers
Current migration trends are likely to continue in the future because recent Al-
banian migration has been driven by economic reasons (King, 2003) combined
with the fact that many Albanian households continue to live in poverty. Ac-
cording to a poverty assessment study from 2002, an estimated 40 percent of
Albanians have become worse off in terms of food intake and general socioe-
conomic conditions when compared to the beginning of the transition period
(De Soto et al., 2002).
Two peaks in both temporary and permanent emigration from Albania can
be distinguished. Emigration from Albania increased sharply between 1990
and 1993. During this period the Albanian government liberalized the issuing
of passports, giving Albanians the right to leave the country and return freely.
The mass emigration during this period was preceded by smaller-scale emi-
gration starting in the summer of 1990 when around 5,000 Albanians sought
refuge at Western embassies in Tirana and were allowed to leave the country,
most finding refuge in Italy (King and Vullnetari, 2003). The first democratic
elections in Albania in 1991, however, brought political turmoil that led to the
mass emigration of Albanians either by boats to Italy or through illegal cross-
ings of the Albanian-Greek border. Estimates are that between 1991 and 1993
approximately 300,000 Albanians, or ten percent of the Albanian population,
left the country, with most going to Greece and Italy.
The second peak in emigration corresponds to the aftermath of the collapse
of the pyramid investment schemes in 1996-1997. An underdeveloped banking
sector led many Albanians to put their savings, which were mostly from remit-
tances and retained earnings from abroad, in pyramid investment schemes that
offered monthly interest rates in excess of ten percent. Contributions to these
schemes are believed to have reached half of the country’s GDP in 1995-1996
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(King and Vullnetari, 2003; King, 2003). Most Albanians lost their savings after
the investment schemes collapsed in early 1997. The political and economic
chaos that followed created a new wave of emigration.
Emigration, Return Migration and Migrants Abroad
From a level of virtually zero emigration during the communist period Alba-
nia rapidly became one of the top migration source countries in the world. Ac-
cording to estimates provided in Barjaba (2000), fifteen percent of the Albanian
population lived abroad in 1998. By 2005, the World Bank (2008) estimated that
27.5 percent of the Albanian population, or 860,485 Albanians resided abroad.
In comparison, the Bank estimated that the stock of emigrants as a percentage
of the population of all developing countries in 2005 was 2.7 percent.
Since most emigration from Albania has been illegal and unrecorded, these
and other estimates of the emigration flows taking place over time are specula-
tive (King, 2003). Due to the irregular character of Albanian emigration, there
are also no accurate estimates of the location of Albanian emigrants (Govern-
ment of Albania, 2005). Nevertheless, approximate figures on the stock and the
distribution of Albanian emigrants among host countries at different points in
time are provided by several different sources and summarized in Table 3.1.
Estimates from the Albanian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and Euro-
stat suggest that the number of Albanian emigrants abroad in 1999 was approx-
imately 800,000 (Barjaba, 2000). Estimates for 2001 from the Albanian Institute
for Statistics (INSTAT) are based on the 2001 Housing and Population Census.
These official figures, however, are likely to be underestimated since they do
not take into consideration temporary migrants and the Albanians who have
spent less than one year abroad2 (King, 2003). The figures, however, are close
to those provided by the OECD for the same period based on country censuses,
labor force surveys and socio-economic surveys from different countries. The
most recent estimates from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs from 2004
report that the number of Albanians living abroad exceeded one million (King,
2003; Government of Albania, 2005). Recent World Bank (2008) figures on mi-
gration combining various data sources, however, suggest that the number of
Albanians living abroad in 2005 was much lower at 860,485.
Figure 3.1 contains estimates of the temporary and permanent emigration
flows for the period 1990-2002 (Carletto et al., 2005). These estimates are based
on the 2002 and 2003 Albanian LSMS and are lower than the true figures be-
cause they do not take into account migrants who have left no household mem-
2These migrants are still considered as household members by the census.
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bers behind. Finally, the research by Konica and Filer (2009) is the only study
which provides estimates on return migration flows (see Figure 3.2). Unfor-
tunately, since the survey used for this study was conducted in early 1996,
their estimates only cover the early stages of the transition period before the
collapse of the pyramid schemes. One can observe, however, that during 1993-
1994 there was a distinct slowing of the upward net emigration trend and some
increase in return migration. One can only speculate, however, whether this
trend has continued or has been reversed by events such as the collapse of the
pyramid investment schemes. Clearly the extent and behavior of return mi-
grants is an important area for future research.
Estimates of Remittances
According to recent data, Albania is among the countries that receive the largest
amount of remittances relative to its GDP (World Bank, 2008). Recorded remit-
tances were approximately 1.5 billion US dollars or 15 percent of the country’s
GDP in 2006 and 2007. According to the official statistics of the Bank of Alba-
nia, remittances increased substantially between 1992 and 2006, although they
fell as a share of GDP and other measures of economic activity (Figure 3.3 and
Table 3.2).
Official statistics, however, are likely to substantially understate the ac-
tual level of remittance inflows since remittances are frequently transferred to
households in Albania through informal channels. Respondents interviewed
in 1996 by Konica and Filer (2009) reported receipts of remittances that were 70
percent greater than the official figures in Figure 3.3. Korovilas (1999) reports a
similar figure and estimates actual remittances to Albania are 75% higher than
officially recorded flows. The underestimation of remittances by official figures
is reinforced by the fact that, in addition to informal cash flows, it is hard with
official data to detect the substantial flow of remittances in the form of physical
goods (see Konica and Filer, 2009; Mançellari et al., 1996, for a discussion).
The cyclical pattern of emigration flows and remittances suggests that em-
igration from Albania is a strategic response to the need to find alternative
income sources in order to ease poverty at home. An increase in emigration in
the aftermath of the pyramid crisis in 1996-1997, for instance, was succeeded by
an increase in the amount of remittances received by the Albanian households
in subsequent years (Figure 3.3).
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Data Sources Used in Previous Studies
A lack of individual and household data on migrants and non-migrants from
Albania, largely due to the absence of appropriate sampling frames, has ham-
pered empirical research on migration from Albania and its consequences. Be-
fore data from the first Albania LSMS in 2002 became available, a number of
studies were conducted using self-collected surveys or convenience samples
of migrants and non-migrants and their households that achieved various de-
grees of representativeness.
This problem is not specific to Albania. Migrants are “rare elements” in the
population and representative surveys of migrant households are rare (McKen-
zie and Mistiaen, 2007). Researchers tend to use specialized surveys of non-
probability samples of migrants and non-migrants and their families, which
are often based on the snowball method of collecting data, or data collected
from regions with high emigration. With few data sets using fully appropri-
ate survey methods, many studies are done on non-representative samples of
the population of migrants and their families and, therefore, provide biased
results.
In the case of Albania, the small number of datasets available makes this
problem even more severe. Many studies make use of the same data imply-
ing that their results may not be independent. Table 3.3 summarizes the of-
ficial statistics and sample surveys used in the studies of Albanian migration
to date. The three waves of the Living Standards Measurement Survey have
clearly done a professional job of insuring randomness and representativeness,
but they only provide data for the period ten or more years after the start of
the transition. Among earlier data sources, the sample survey conducted by
Konica and Filer (2009) appears to be the most scientific.
Composition of Migrants
Despite the paucity of data, there are several studies of the characteristics of
migrants and the micro-level correlates of migration in Albania. These results
often need to be interpreted with caution in view of data limitations (Carletto
et al., 2005; Stampini et al., 2008). To illustrate, Gedeshi (2002), Kule et al. (2002)
and de Coulon and Piracha (2005) are based on data of unknown representa-
tiveness. Labrianidis and Lyberaki (2004) and Labrianidis and Kazazi (2006)
use data collected from a snowball sample of migrants who returned from
Greece or Italy. Cavounidis (2004) bases her study of Albanian migrants in
Greece on data from the 2001 Greek census and the Albanian migrants who
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have chosen to undergo legalization in Greece in 1998.3 Castaldo et al. (2005,
2007) use data on intentions to migrate, which may not be a good indicator of
actual future migration, and is limited to those who had not already migrated
by 2002. Konica and Filer (2009), Carletto et al. (2005), Carletto et al. (2006)
and Stampini et al. (2008) use surveys that only contain data on migrants who
have left no household members behind. The sample in Arrehag et al. (2006)
is limited to one district in Albania characterized by very high out-migration
rates while the sample analyzed by Germenji and Swinnen (2005) consists of
rural households only.
Despite these limitations, certain conclusions regarding the profile of Alba-
nian migrants are so strong that they can be asserted with confidence. Table 3.4
summarizes the characteristics of migrants in chronological order of the stud-
ies. The majority of the Albanian migrants chose Greece and Italy as their des-
tination and emigrated illegally, at least during the first years of the transition.
This was before the regularization programs in Greece and Italy were imple-
mented. The migrants are disproportionately male, relatively young, working-
age individuals with secondary or secondary vocational education.
Education most likely affects the migration decision in a non-linear way.
In the rural regions of Albania individuals with secondary education are more
likely to emigrate than those with only primary education (Germenji and Swin-
nen, 2005). Having a university degree, however, is not associated with a
higher propensity to emigrate. These results may be due to the better in-
come and employment opportunities in Albania for college graduates com-
bined with a low return on Albanian education in foreign labor markets.
There is, however, evidence of positive selection on education at all lev-
els among female migrants (although not among male migrants), but that the
importance of education declines over time for both females and males, and
the decline is more pronounced for males (Stecklov et al., 2008). This finding
might be a result of increasing labor market inequality within Albania, which
increases the returns to migration for better educated females in comparison to
males.
Greece appears to attract less skilled and lower income migrants than Italy
(Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2004), perhaps due to both higher migration costs
to Italy, as well as the peculiarities of the Greek labor market given that Greece
has the largest shadow economy among EU countries, making it easier for even
illegal immigrants to find an unskilled job (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004).
The characteristics of Albanian migrants in different countries may depend
on the type of migration in which they are involved. During the summer hol-
3Studies using Greek data must always be interpreted with caution because it is often difficult
to differentiate between Albanians and Kosovars and Macedonians of Albanian ethnicity.
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idays, for instance, a number of teachers and public sector employees migrate
temporarily to Greece for employment in the agricultural sector to supplement
low public sector wages. Earnings from such seasonal work may well exceed
the annual salary of a secondary school teacher in Albania (King and Vull-
netari, 2003). Thus, there may be a lower than expected correlation among
education and job level for migrants to Greece.
Albanian migrants originate primarily from the coastal regions and the re-
gions close to the border with Greece. The Greek border can be crossed on foot,
which significantly reduces migration costs for those who live in the south
of Albania (Germenji and Swinnen, 2005). Older individuals, however, may
have more trouble coping with the physical difficulties encountered crossing
the Albanian-Greek border (De Soto et al., 2002).
Migrants typically come from lower-income households. Migrants’ net-
works in the destination country are likely to have a significant role in reducing
the cost of migration for these individuals. The poorest households, however,
are often not able to send migrants abroad due to an inability to finance the
initial move (De Soto et al., 2002; Germenji and Swinnen, 2005). Indeed, ac-
cording a recent World Bank poverty assessment report on Albania cited by
De Soto et al. (2002), one definition of being poor in Albania is not being able
to send a migrant abroad. Furthermore, considerable anecdotal evidence ex-
ists, at least from rural areas, that access to different types of income affects the
decision to send a migrant abroad. Access to non-farming income is associated
with a lower propensity to send a migrant abroad. This pattern implies that
migration is one of several ways used to diversify income sources for the rural
population (Germenji and Swinnen, 2005).
While the first emigration wave from Albania in the early 90s consisted pri-
marily of illegal migrants, a large number of those currently abroad are legal.
While this tendency may have resulted in part from differential return rates,
especially due to capture by foreign immigration authorities, many Albanians
in Greece and Italy (the two predominant destinations for Albanian migrants)
have taken advantage of the opportunities given by the Greek and Italian gov-
ernments to legalize their status. Since 1999 the balance between the number
of illegal and legal Albanian migrants has been changing in favor of the legal
ones (Barjaba, 2000). After the regularization procedures in Greece and in Italy,
the estimated ratios of irregular to regular migrants were 1:4 in Italy and 1:1 in
Greece in 2000.
Following legalization of their status, many emigrants have also chosen to
reunite with their families in the host countries (de Zwager et al., 2005). This
has led to an increase in female emigration from Albania in recent years, with
the number of female migrants in Greece increasing two-fold in 2001 compared
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to the first emigration wave (King and Vullnetari, 2003). Illegal crossings of the
Albanian-Greek border are typically undertaken by groups of Albanian men.
Thus, when men and women are compared, a larger share of the female mi-
gration is legal (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Arrehag et al., 2006). In addition to
moves for family reunification in the host country after regularization, female
migration has risen relative to male migration due to the USA’s Diversity Visa
programs and Canada’s Skilled Worker Visa program. Finally, the ratio of fe-
male to male migrants in recent years has increased because it has become
more common for young Albanians to emigrate to obtain an education (King
and Vullnetari, 2003).
The size of temporary migration flows towards more distant destinations,
such as Italy and Germany, is also slowly increasing. This may be due to accu-
mulating household migration experience and improving migration networks,
which reduce the cost of more distant migrations (Carletto et al., 2005, 2006;
Stampini et al., 2008).
Two types of returning migrants can be distinguished: those who return to
resettle in Albania and circular migrants for whom a return precedes another
migration to the same or another country (King and Vullnetari, 2003). Cir-
cular migration, whereby migration episodes and temporary returns to Alba-
nia alternate, is widespread among Albanians (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2004;
Labrianidis and Kazazi, 2006). Circular migrants tend, however, to spend only
short periods abroad. Labrianidis and Lyberaki (2004) report that about 40
percent of the respondents in their sample of migrants return to Albania once
a year and another 28.5 percent return even more frequently. Because of the
geographic proximity and the land border between Albania and Greece, which
is easier and less costly to cross than the sea border with Italy, migrants to
Greece return to Albania substantially more frequently than those to Italy. For
the sample of migrants in Labrianidis and Lyberaki (2004), the percentage of
migrants who have migrated more than once to Greece is 28 percent while and
the percentage of migrants who have migrated to Italy more than once is 3.6
percent. Furthermore, their study indicates 23 percent of the return migrants
in the sample move back and forth between Albania and Greece or Italy, thus
“living in two countries” and taking advantage of the seasonal and temporary
employment opportunities in the Greek and Italian labor markets.
Permanent return migrants may come back to Albania for diverse reasons.
For many Albanians the purpose of emigration is not to settle permanently in
the host country, but rather to accumulate sufficient earnings abroad to estab-
lish a small-scale, household business (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2004; Nichol-
son, 2001, 2004; Cuka et al., 2003). In samples of returned migrants, the average
stay abroad is seven years (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2004); and remittances,
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which are frequently used to establish small enterprises, tend to be saved until
migrants return from abroad (Konica and Filer, 2009).
Greece might be the most feasible destination country because of its close
proximity, but it is not the most desirable. The money saved from working
there may also be used to finance onward migration to more distant countries
(King and Vullnetari, 2003; Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Labrianidis and Lyberaki,
2004). Others may return to Albania because they are disappointed with the
jobs they can actually obtain abroad or discover improved opportunities in Al-
bania. Furthermore, many returns to Albania are involuntary and result from
enforcement actions by destination countries’ police forces (Konica and Filer,
2009).
One can distinguish between temporary and permanent migrants. Those
in Italy and more distant countries tend to be better educated than either non-
migrants or migrants in Greece (Carletto et al., 2005, 2006; Stampini et al., 2008).
Temporary migrants to Greece also come from relatively lower income house-
holds. This may be explained by the fact that relatively more wealthy house-
holds or more educated migrants are more likely to afford the higher cost of
a more distant migration, as well as by the fact that it might be easier for the
better educated Albanians to adapt and find employment in Italy, where the
wages are higher and more non-agricultural employment is available than in
Greece. Temporary migrants come mostly from mountainous rural areas and
the central regions in Albania. Permanent migrants to Italy originate mostly
from Tirana and the urban coastal and mountain areas. Temporary migrants to
Greece mostly originate from the rural areas in the northern and central parts
of Albania, whereas temporary migrants to Italy and other countries in Europe
mostly originate from the urban coastal areas, agricultural communities and
the mountain regions in Albania (Carletto et al., 2005). The rural areas of the
district of Korce are more likely than the urban areas to send seasonal migrants
abroad. This is probably due to the fewer sources of income available to rural
households (Arrehag et al., 2005).
Potential Migration
Evidence from data on stated intentions to migrate is largely consistent with
the evidence based on data on actual migration. Relatively younger individu-
als (mostly in the 26-35 age group) and males are more likely to be considering
emigration, and the unemployed and individuals with secondary and voca-
tional education exhibit the greatest desire to migrate. Outside of Tirana, and
especially in rural areas, those who are relatively less poor are more likely to
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consider migration. Females in households with permanent migrants are more
likely to be planning to migrate than those in households without migrants
(Castaldo et al., 2005, 2007).
The gaps in earnings and employment between Albania and its EU neigh-
bors continue to be large, implying that the migration patterns of recent years
are unlikely to change in the near future (Barjaba, 2000; Castaldo et al., 2007).
Although many Albanians believe that migration to Greece is less costly and
that it is easier to find work in Greece than in other countries, potential mi-
grants from Albania state that the most desirable destinations are the USA,
Germany and Italy (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Cavounidis, 2004). Migration to
Greece is often regarded as temporary and only a precursor to further and
more permanent migration to another EU country or to North America (King
and Vullnetari, 2003; Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2004). Relaxing the visa regime
in the EU for Albanians by the EU will further reduce the cost of emigration to
EU destinations other than Greece, enticing more Albanians to migrate directly
to those countries. Such visa relaxation would also lead to an increase in the
migration of relatively better educated Albanians. Past evidence suggests that
more educated workers (with better options in Albania itself) are less willing
to migrate illegally and subsequently be forced to work in the irregular econ-
omy upon arrival in the destination country (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2004;
Labrianidis and Kazazi, 2006; Carletto et al., 2005, 2006; Stampini et al., 2008).
Thus, an EU visa policy change could have implications for the potential brain
drain from Albania.
Impacts of Migration
As one of the countries most affected by migration after the end of the com-
munist era in Central and Eastern Europe, Albania has been referred to as a
“laboratory for the study of migration and development” (King, 2003). The
direction of the causal relationship between migration and economic devel-
opment in Albania, however, is not necessarily obvious (King, 2003). Several
factors are at work, including brain drain effects, the impact of remittances on
consumption demand and business formation, and the joint impact of migra-
tion and remittances on labor supply.
Evidence on the brain drain from Albania is both scarce and controversial.
According to World Bank estimates (2008), the cumulative migration rate of the
tertiary educated from Albania was 20 percent by 2000. Since the majority of
the Albanians who complete a doctoral degree in Western Europe or in the US
do not return to Albania (Germenji and Gedeshi, 2008), one may argue that this
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percentage is much higher. According to data from UNDP and the World Bank,
over 25,000 Albanian university-level students were studying abroad in 2006,
whereas the estimated number of Albanian students enrolled in public univer-
sities in Albania was only around 43,600. Many of these locally-educated Al-
banians eventually enroll in graduate schools abroad (Germenji and Gedeshi,
2008). Thus, with increasing migration for education purposes, much of the
current danger of brain drain from Albania likely comes not from the fact that
the more educated emigrate, but rather from the fact that the Albanians who
obtain their education abroad find no reason to return to Albania.
The USA and Canada are currently the primary destinations for Albanian
migrants with university educations (Germenji and Gedeshi, 2008). The inter-
views Germenji and Gedeshi (2008) conducted with representatives of univer-
sities and research institutions in Albania revealed that between 1991 and 2005,
approximately 1,295 scientific workers emigrated, even though the total num-
ber of persons employed at universities and research institutes in Albania in
2005 was only about 2,500. Thus, about half of the scientific work force has em-
igrated, most of them with their families. The majority of those who left were
in the 25-34 age group at the time of their emigration, representing a serious
loss of the country’s most capable scientific workers.
A problem that has only recently been addressed by the literature on Alba-
nian migration is that emigration affects elderly people through the so-called
“care drain.” Although partially offset by the beneficial role of remittances for
poverty reduction in Albania, emigration of the young puts substantial pres-
sure on the inadequately developed elderly care system in Albania (De Soto
et al., 2002; Vullnetari and King, 2008).
Migration significantly affects the home economy and the household mem-
bers left behind through the remittances that migrants send and the savings the
migrants accumulate abroad. The majority of Albanian migrants send remit-
tances, generally to immediate family members (de Zwager et al., 2005). The
amount of remittances sent to wives and children of emigrants is much larger
than the amount sent to other family members (Gedeshi, 2002).
Remittances to Albania are usually sent irregularly and through informal
channels due to the underdevelopment of the Albanian banking system and
its limited geographical scope (Gedeshi, 2002) and the proximity of the major
host countries that allows for frequent returns of both migrants themselves and
members of their networks (Arrehag et al., 2005; de Zwager et al., 2005).
Recent empirical evidence from developing countries in general suggests
that remittances reduce poverty (Adams, 2007). There is also evidence of a cor-
relation between migration and poverty in Albania. The majority of Albanian
households who identify themselves as relatively more prosperous have had
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at least one emigrant family member who spent between 13 and 60 months
abroad during the 90s (De Soto et al., 2002). Not surprisingly, most remittance
income is spent on consumption and necessities, while the second most com-
mon use of remittances is refurbishing or building a house (De Soto et al., 2002;
Gedeshi, 2002; King and Vullnetari, 2003; Konica and Filer, 2009). Albanian
households that receive remittances have higher consumption patterns with
respect to basic necessities such as food than households without remittances
(Castaldo and Reilly, 2007). As summarized by Mançellari et al. (1996):
...[remittances] raised considerably disposable incomes and spend-
ing within the country, and the demand for imported consumer
and production goods. This in turn has stimulated a rapid rise in
small-scale trade and investment projects. Non-cash remittances
include not just consumer goods, such as electronics and second-
hand cars, but also second-hand production goods such as vans,
tractors, and other machinery. Therefore, not only do remittances
give the economy a new, prosperous look, with many new shops
and restaurants, but they also have a direct and significant effect on
production, by easing the foreign exchange constraint on buying
key inputs (p. 483).
Interviews with migrants’ households in Albania indicate that urban house-
holds also tend to use remittances to finance education-related expenditures
while rural households pay debts or invest in agriculture (Arrehag et al., 2005;
de Zwager et al., 2005).
The number of Albanian households involved in agriculture is significant
and migration within the family has been found to have an effect on the type
of agricultural investments made. McCarthy et al. (2006) find that permanent
migration of former household members leads to more investment in livestock
production and to higher agricultural and total household incomes. Previous
migration of a current household member reduces livestock holdings but in-
creases fruit cultivation (especially in the case of previous migration to Greece).
This difference might be a result of the experience the migrants acquire as agri-
cultural workers in Greece. Migrants’ households make fewer agricultural
investments in crop production, such as fertilizer and equipment, but invest
more in livestock production (Miluka et al., 2007). This pattern may be a re-
sult of the differing labor intensity of various agricultural activities combined
with the impact of prime age males being missing from households through
migration.
Albanian households receiving remittances from abroad have significantly
higher than average budget shares spent on durables and utilities (Castaldo
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and Reilly, 2007). Migrants and their households in Albania typically invest
in small retail or hospitality businesses, such as shops, bars, restaurants or
small hotels (King and Vullnetari, 2003). Thus, taking into account the small
scale of household entrepreneurial projects in Albania, durable goods such as
refrigerators, cars, or agricultural equipment might be considered productive
investment as they are often used by the Albanians in their household business
(Nicholson, 2001, 2004; Castaldo et al., 2007).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the effect of migration on the labor supply
of the non-migrant family members left in Albania can be positive since other
members of households in which the males are abroad need to compensate
for the absence of the migrants by working more. This is particularly true
in rural areas, where it is common for the households to work on their own
land (De Soto et al., 2002; Vullnetari and King, 2008). Remittances, however,
are a source of non-labor income for those household members who remain in
Albania, and may reduce the probability of Albanian women working (Konica
and Filer, 2009). A distinct negative effect can be found on the labor force
participation for women, although the effect is limited to households with a
migrant in Italy (Carletto et al., 2006). This pattern may be because the earnings
of the migrants in Italy are higher. Such an effect is important in the case of
Albania as unemployment pressures on the local labor market are decreased
not only through emigration, but also through the reduction in female labor
supply.
Data from 2005 show that members of households with migrants spend
fewer hours working in agriculture, both in total and in per capita terms (Miluka
et al., 2007). In order to partially offset missing male labor, however, women
in such households work more than females in households without migrants.
There is also evidence that migrants’ households make fewer agricultural in-
vestments in crop production, but they do invest in livestock production. This
evidence leads to the conclusion that migration in Albania may be a strategy
to divest from crop production and invest into livestock. One can expect that
this may eventually lead to land sales, land consolidation, and an agricultural
sector with better investment and return prospects in Albania.
Macroeconomic data from a large number of countries for the period 1975-
2003, indicate that the amount of remittances has a positive impact on the ratio
of bank credit to the private sector and the share of bank deposits as a percent-
age of GDP (Aggarwal et al., 2006). There is, however, no evidence of this effect
in Albania. One suggestion is that the Albanian financial sector is currently not
able to effectively allocate remittances to productive activities and that, while
the banking sector has been somewhat more successful recently in attracting
the savings of migrants, the majority of Albanian households still place little
78
Chapter 3 Impacts of Migration
trust in the formal financial sector (Uruçi and Gedeshi, 2003).
León-Ledesma and Piracha (2004) studied the impact of return migration
on economic development in Central and Eastern Europe during the transition
from communism from a macroeconomic perspective. Due to the fact that mi-
grants’ remittances and savings can be used to finance consumption and pro-
ductive investment that lead to job creation, they find evidence from Central
and Eastern European countries (unfortunately from a sample that does not
include Albania) that a larger number of return migrants increases labor pro-
ductivity. Although there is little evidence of large investments resulting solely
from migration and remittances in Albania (Barjaba, 2000), there is more than
anecdotal evidence that they support the private sector development by allow-
ing migrants’ households to invest in small-scale household business projects
(Konica and Filer, 2009; Kilic et al., 2007).
It is the return of migrants themselves that is critical in establishing small
enterprises, rather than the simple sending of funds to family members left
behind (Konica and Filer, 2009). A specialized survey revealed that although
most Albanian migrants work illegally and in low-skilled occupations, the sav-
ings and skills acquired abroad help to establish their own business upon re-
turn. Thus, temporary migration in Albania may be motivated by the possibil-
ity of improving the migrants’ chances of finding better employment opportu-
nities upon return (Kule et al., 2002). The same data also revealed that return
migrants are almost twice as likely to be self-employed as those who never
migrated (Coulon and Piracha, 2005).
Return migrants from Greece and Italy are better off in terms of both em-
ployment and living conditions than they were prior to migration, and return
migrants from Greece perform relatively better in the Albanian labor market
upon return than those who migrated to Italy (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2004;
Labrianidis and Kazazi, 2006). A positive correlation between the length of stay
abroad and the likeliness of owning a business upon return is also evident.4
More recent nationally representative data from the 2005 Albanian LSMS show
that men with previous migration experience are more likely to work off-farm
and be self-employed (Carletto et al., 2006).
A study that attempts to control for possible endogeneity of the migration
decision and length of stay abroad finds that past household migration expe-
rience has a positive impact on the probability of owning a business and that
work experience in Italy is relatively more important than migration experi-
ence from Greece (Kilic et al., 2007). The positive effect is seen, however, only
for migration experience during 1990-2000. Based on the findings, the authors
4All the findings, however, are not based on nationally representative survey data and, there-
fore, should be interpreted with caution.
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suggest that more recent migrants may still need to acquire additional skills
and/or savings in order to complete their “migration cycle” and establish a
business upon return.
Although significant return migration may be desirable for a number of
reasons, the return of those migrants who emigrated in the mid-1990s during
the first wave of emigration to Greece and Italy was interrupted by the pyramid
scheme crisis, which sent a new wave of Albanian migrants abroad (de Zwager
et al., 2005). During recent years there has been little evidence of voluntary
return migration, and those who do return are mostly involuntarily returned
by foreign immigration authorities, seasonal workers in Greece, or household
members who spend short periods abroad to augment the insufficient incomes
they earn in Albania or to accumulate savings that would enable them to invest
in a small household business at home. It may also be that return migration is
motivated partially by “push” factors such as a failure to integrate abroad or
to earn enough to be able to send remittances (Barjaba, 2000; King, 2003) rather
than the attraction of increased opportunities in Albania.
The Albanian government and the International Organization for Migra-
tion (IOM) in Tirana have recently made efforts to attract return migrants by
providing material and financial assistance to those who choose to return and
reintegrate. However, the number of emigrants who have returned this way
has been insignificant. Between 2000 and 2004, just over 300 emigrants took
advantage of these programs (de Zwager et al., 2005). More than half of Alba-
nian migrants abroad who have been interviewed by IOM Tirana would like
to return to Albania in the future, possibly during the period 2010-2015. These
predictions, however, can only be based on stated intentions to return rather
than what actually happens. It is unrealistic to expect that significant return
migration will occur in the near future, particularly among the economically
active population abroad, as long as the large income gaps between Albania
and the destination countries persist (Vullnetari, 2007).
A further impediment to potential return flows is the increase in family
reunification emigration during recent years, especially after the regulariza-
tion processes in Greece and Italy (Vullnetari, 2007). The return of children of
current migrants who have settled abroad seems unlikely. Among Albanians
who emigrated during the first waves, some may return after retirement due
to cost of living differentials. Such return migration, if it occurs, is likely to be
directed mostly towards Tirana or urban areas. It will further exacerbate hous-
ing shortages, and is unlikely to inject significant investment into the Albanian
economy.
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Analysis, Trends and Policy Recommendations
The prospects of significant return migration to Albania are bleak, largely due
to a lack of investment opportunities. This situation is aggravated by the per-
sistently low incomes and spending capacity in Albania, the lack of long-term
credit, poor basic services, and underdeveloped infrastructure.
The trends towards regularization and integration in the host countries also
make future return migration of the younger generation unlikely. Albanians
currently account for over half of the total number of immigrants in Greece
and, compared to other immigrant groups, a large number of Albanian chil-
dren attend Greek schools (Cavounidis, 2004). The growth in remittances to
Albania may also decrease in the future with family reunion and integration
trends becoming stronger in the host countries (Gedeshi, 2002).
While investment in infrastructure, especially in the rural areas, may de-
crease emigration and attract return migration through increasing the invest-
ment opportunities in the Albanian private sector, access to alternative income
sources, lower migration costs and higher incomes for the poorest households
may lead to more households being able to send migrants abroad (Germenji
and Swinnen, 2005). Furthermore, the potential increase in emigration towards
other EU countries may lead to further human capital flight from Albania.
Overall, it seems unrealistic to expect major changes in the pattern of Albania
being a major exporter of labor in coming years.
The possibility of future EU enlargement to include Albania, as well as
countries that are similar to Albania in terms of economic conditions and re-
cent emigration patterns, such as Moldova, Macedonia (already a candidate)
and other countries in the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus, calls for
a comparison with previous EU enlargements in order to speculate about the
potential impact on migration in Europe following further EU enlargement.
Currently, Albania is at the upper end of the distribution among the po-
tential accession countries and significantly above the recent EU joiners (see
Table 3.5) in both the number of migrants and remittances as a share of GDP.5
Official estimates of the remittances as a percentage of GDP in 1994 which are
available for some of the transition countries6 indicate that, unlike the earlier
joiners from 2004, the economies of the next wave of potential accession coun-
tries have been heavily and consistently reliant on remittances. In 1994, for
instance, remittances exceeded 15 percent of Albania’s GDP, while, with the
5The comparison with Cyprus and Malta is not indicative as both economies are relatively small
and have simultaneously experienced large immigration inflows.
6Data on remittances as a percentage of GDP in 1994 is available for Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia from the World
Bank WDI 2008.
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exception of Cyprus and Slovenia, remittances in all other countries were be-
low 1 percent of GDP.
Furthermore, a comparison of the change in the official remittances between
2002 (one year before the accession) and 2005 (one year after the accession) for
the group of countries that joined the union in 2004 and two control groups of
countries during the same period (low income prior EU members7 and non-
accession CEE countries8) shows that remittances for the 2004 accession wave
increased substantially more than the remittances for the other two groups.
Remittances to joiners increased by 160 percent, compared with an increase of
85 percent for non-accession CEE countries and a fall of 5 percent for remit-
tances to low-income current EU members.9 The larger increase in remittances
after accession, despite restrictions on labor migration imposed by some old
EU members, suggests that potential EU accession is unlikely to undermine
the importance of remittances as a source of household income not only for the
Albanian economy, but also for the economies of other potential joiners which
currently exhibit migration patterns similar to those of Albania.
In short, the issue of potential EU accession and its effect on Albania is
complex. There is no reason to believe that emigration will not continue to play
an important role for Albania. Indeed, accession may even increase outflow in
the absence of severe restrictions on labor mobility, especially that of highly
trained workers, which would violate the principle of Europe being a single
economic space. On the other hand, in a global economy it is possible that
Albania’s comparative advantage may well be a skilled, motivated labor force,
and that the long-run development of the country can best be promoted by
its neighbors recognizing that easy access to improved opportunities abroad
may well be the best form of development assistance that can be provided to
Albania and other, similarly situated, countries.
7Greece, Spain and Portugal.
8Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova and Serbia.
9These figures exclude Estonia, Slovakia and Romania, where data inconsistencies cause us to
doubt the reported magnitude of remittance increases.
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Table 3.1: Estimates of the Number of Albanians Living Abroad from Various
Sources
1a 2b 3c 4d 5e 6f
Australia 1,451
Austria 856 1,834 2,000
Belgium 368 2,500 1,413 5,000




France 2,000 2,000 2,666 2,000
Germany 11,343 12,000 15,000
Greece 500,000 500,000 403,852 600,000
Hungary 74 141
Ireland 10 208














Switzerland 791 1,504 1,500
The Netherlands 449 437 1,000
Turkey 2,000 3,313 5,000
United Kingdom 5,000 2,314 50,000
USA 12,000 39,780 150,000
Total 721,351 735,500 663,000 626,388 860,485 1,093,000
Sources: Barjaba (2000), King (2003, 2005), OECD (2006), The World 
Bank (2008)
Notes: The figures above are based on estimates originally provided by: aEurostat 
(1999); bThe Albanian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (2001); cINSTAT(2002); 





Figure 3.1: Albanian Emigration (1990-2002)
Note: The figures are based on the 2002 and 2003 Albania LSMS.








































Figure 3.2: Emigration and Return Migration (1989-1996)














Figure 3.3: Workers’ Remittances (1992-2006): Millions of USD








































Table 3.2: Remittances as Share of GDP, FDI, and Official Development
Assistance and Official Aid (1992-2006)
Year Share of GDP Share of FDI
Share of ODA and 
OA
1992 0.21 7.5 0.37
1993 0.22 4.74 0.93
1994 0.13 4.99 1.62
1995 0.16 5.49 2.13
1996 0.17 5.54 2.21
1997 0.12 5.62 1.61
1998 0.17 10.05 1.68
1999 0.10 8.66 0.73
2000 0.14 3.71 1.67
2001 0.15 2.97 2.28
2002 0.14 4.77 2.09
2003 0.14 4.37 2.23
2004 0.14 3.14 3.44
2005 0.14 4.49 3.64
2006 0.13 3.74 3.66
Note: The data presented is total workers' remittances in millions of current USD, official BoP 
statistics.
Source: The World Bank World Development Indicators 2008
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Table 3.3: Data Sources Used in Previous Studies
Year Sample Size Sampling Frame Selection Criteria
Official Statistics
Albania Population and Housing Census 1989 3,182,417 No sampling Whole population covered
Programme for Regularization of Unauthorized Migrants in 
Greece
1998 241,561 Albanians (out of 
371,641 non-Greek 
applicants)  
No sampling Migrants who have applied for 
regularization in Greece (i.e., migrants 
who either entered Greece illegaly or 
entered legally but subsequently became 
illegal)
Albania Population and Housing Census 2001 3,069,275 No sampling Whole population covered
Greece Population Census 2001 438,036 Albanians No sampling Whole population covered
Sample Surveys
Konica and Filer (2005) 1996 1,000 households Random selection of geographic areas - 
one town per region. Random selection 
of interviewed households within area 
from electricity service records
Whole population covered
Survey of individuals and firms in Albania conducted within 
the Phare-ACE project framework
1998 1,500 individuals and 200 
firms
None Individuals (only one person per 
household qualifies for the sample) in all 
regions of Albania and firms in 23 (out 
of 36) regions; In each region the 
number of individuals interviewed 
corresponds approximately to the size of 
the population
Sample survey of newly regularized migrant population in 
Greece (Cavounidis, 2004)
2000 1,074 individuals All migrants in Greece who have been 
regularized under the regularization 
program in 1998 and who have 
successfully submitted applications for 
obtaining a "green card"
Quotas set by nationality and gender 
based on the information provided in 
the "green card" application
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Year Sample Size Sampling Frame Selection Criteria
Survey on the foreign currency remittances from emigration 
(Gedeshi, 2002)
2000 350 individuals None Legal, non-seasonal Albanian 
emigrants living in Greece, Italy, France, 
the US, and Canada, interviewed either 
at the border areas in Albania or via e-
mail 
Survey of rural households in Albania 2000 1,232 households 
(4,566 individuals)
1998 Agricultural Census records Multi-stage random sample of rural 
households in Albania
An Inquiry on Emigration and Remittances Flow in the 
Scutari District conducted by the Center for Economic and 
Social Studies (CESS), Tirana and Centro Studi di Politica 
Internazionale (CeSPI), Rome (Uruci and Gedeshi, 2003)
2001-
2002
48 migrants and 48 
households
None Migrants from the Scutari district in 
Albania, interviewed at the border 
regions and in small towns in the south 
of Albania, emigrants's households 
living in the Scutari district
Survey in the district of Korce by the Center for Refugee and 
Migration Studies of the International Catholic Migration 
Commission 
2002 1,315 households (5,301 
individuals)
The 2001 Population and Housing 
Census records
Migrant and non-migrant households in 
rural and urban areas in the Korce 
district; oversampling in the the most 
affected by emigration and 
depopulation western part of the district
Socioeconomic Household Survey by the World Bank (De 
Soto, 2002)
2002 460 households (2,300 
individuals)
Lists of residents provided by leaders 
of villages and municipalities
Households randomly selected in 10 
preselected sites in Albania (45-47 
households per site) with approximately 
equal representation of rural areas, peri-
urban areas and municipalities in each 
site
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Year Sample Size Sampling Frame Selection Criteria
Survey among return migrants from Greece and Italy 
(Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2004; Labrianidis and Kazazi, 
2006)
2002 324 individuals (300 
males and 24 females)
None Return migrants over 18 years old from 
various parts in Albania who have lived 
in Albania for at least one year following 
a stay either in Greece or in Italy where 
they have spent at least one year 
(snowball sampling)
Albania Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) 2002 3,599 households (16,521 
individuals)
The list of enumeration areas prepared 
for the purposes of the 2001 Population 
and Housing Census 
Multi-stage stratified random sample, 
national coverage
Albania LSMS (Albania Panel Survey Wave 2) 2003 2,155 households The households interviewed for the 
Albania LSMS in 2002 (Wave 1)
Multi-stage stratified random sample, 
national coverage (approximately half 
the 2002 LSMS households have been re-
interviewed for Wave 2 of the panel)
Albania Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) 2005 3,638 households An updated frame of enumeration 
areas resulting from the 2001 
Population and Housing Census
Multi-stage stratified random sample, 
national coverage
Survey of Migrants and Migrant Households by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) Tirana
2005 698 migrants abroad and 
1,006 households in 
Albania
None Albanian legal and illegal emigrants in 
targeted areas of Greece, Italy, and the 
UK; Households with at least one 
member working abroad, selected from 
the regions of Korca, Kukes, Elbasani, 
Gjirokaster, and Shkoder
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Table 3.4: Composition of Migrants
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reverse is true for 
those who 
migrate to Italy
Notes: aThe study refers to the Albanian migrants in Greece only; bThe authors use intentions data to examine the factors that influence the propensity to consider 
migration among those who have not migrated in the preceding five years; cThe study is based on a survey conducted in the Korce district; dThe study is on temporary 
work migration from rural areas only.
101
Table 3.5: Albanian Emigration and Remittances Compared to Neighboring
Transition Countries
Emigrants as % 
of Population 
(2005)















Serbia & Montenegro 21.9 13.8
Ukraine 13.1 0.8












Slovak Republic 9.6 0.8
Slovenia 6.8 0.8
Source : World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2008
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